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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the quantitative assessment of security in software.
More specifically, it tackles the problem of efficient computation of channel capacity,
the maximum amount of confidential information leaked by software, measured in
Shannon entropy or Rényi’s min-entropy.
Most approaches to computing channel capacity are either efficient and return only
(possibly very loose) upper bounds, or alternatively are inefficient but precise; few
target realistic programs. In this thesis, we present a novel approach to the problem
by reducing it to a model counting problem on first-order logic, which we name Model
Counting Modulo Theories or #SMT for brevity.
For quantitative security, our contribution is twofold. First, on the theoretical side we
establish the connections between measuring confidentiality leaks and fundamental
verification algorithms like Symbolic Execution, SMT solvers and DPLL. Second,
exploiting these connections, we develop novel #SMT-based techniques to compute
channel capacity, which achieve both accuracy and efficiency. These techniques are
scalable to real-world programs, and illustrative case studies include C programs from
Linux kernel, a Java program from a European project and anonymity protocols.
For formal verification, our contribution is also twofold. First, we introduce and
study a new research problem, namely #SMT, which has other potential applications
beyond computing channel capacity, such as returning multiple-counterexamples for
Bounded Model Checking or automated test generation. Second, we propose an
alternative approach for Bounded Model Checking using classical Symbolic Execution,
which can be parallelised to leverage modern multi-core and distributed architecture.
For software engineering, our first contribution is to demonstrate the correspondence
between the algorithm of Symbolic Execution and the DPLL(T ) algorithm used in
state-of-the-art SMT solvers. This correspondence could be leveraged to improve
Symbolic Execution for automated test generation. Finally, we show the relation
between computing channel capacity and reliability analysis in software.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The year 2014 has witnesses several high-profile software security incidents, e.g. the
disclosure of heartbleed bug [3], the leaks of celebrity photos in iCloud [1], the hack
of Sony Pictures [9]. The damage caused by leaking confidential information varies,
from personal embarrassment to the lost of dozens of millions of dollars.
These incidents show the importance of protecting confidential data from being leaked
by software. Access control systems [103] can limit access to information, but cannot
control internal information propagation once accessed. This motivates the research
on information flow security [102], which aims to track the flows of information in
software, and forbid illegal flows that leaks information to public observers.
However, leakage of information is hardly avoidable in computer programs. Even
“secure” programs do leak some information about the secret data being processed.
A popular example is the password checking program, which can be considered as
secure with a reasonably strong password. Every time it rejects an input string, it
reveals to the adversary that the password is different from that string. This amount
of information is small, but if the adversary is allowed to make enough attempts, i.e.
brute force attack, the program will eventually leak all information to the attacker.
As leakage of information is unavoidable, it is important to assess the leaks to decide
if they are acceptable. This leads to the question how much information a program
could leak to an adversary.
The research area of Quantitative Information Flow analysis (QIF [43, 80]) has been
developed to provide a rigorous framework to answer the question above. Intuitively,
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after observing an execution of the program, the adversary gains more information
and has less uncertainty about the confidential data. The difference of uncertainties
before and after his observation is the amount of information leaked by the program.
QIF has based its foundation on the entropy concept of Information Theory [48]:
the uncertainties about the confidential data are measured in bits by, for example,
Shannon entropy; leakage is then computed by numerical subtraction.
Manual computation of QIF, e.g. in [80], is tedious, expensive and infeasible for
complex programs. In order to apply the theory of QIF to practice, it is crucial to
have automated techniques that can efficiently quantify leakage in software systems.
However, most approaches to automation of QIF are either efficient and return only
(possibly very loose) upper bounds [83, 89, 85], or alternatively are inefficient but
precise [16, 66, 75]; few target realistic programs. This thesis is a significant step
towards efficient and accurate computation of QIF by means of formal methods.
1.2 State of the art
This section outlines some of the key advances that have led to the current state of
the art for automation of QIF. Emphasis is given to work on deterministic programs.
The concept of information flow was first introduced in the 1977 paper of the the
Dennings [56], who described a lattice model where variables are partitioned into
security labels: H, standing for “high”, for variables containing sensitive data and L,
standing for “low", for variables containing public information. The partial order
L ≤ H in the lattice indicates that information flows from variables with label H to
variables with label L are not allowed.
In 1982, Goguen and Meseguer [65] described non-interference, a security policy for a
general automaton framework where there are a set of state changing commands and
a set of users. A group of users G have non-interference on another group of users G’
if and only if any user in the group G cannot observe the effects of commands used
by any user in the group G’.
In 1996, Volpano, Smith, and Irvine [114] achieved an impressive milestone by proving
the soundness of the Dennings’ analysis using a type system, which coincides with
the idea of non-interference. Since then, research in information flow has evolved in
different directions. In 2003, Sabelfeld and Myers [102] published an excellent survey
of the field up to that time, citing 147 papers.
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The first complete quantitative analysis of information flow had been developed by
Clark, Hunt and Malacaria through a series of papers [40, 41, 42, 43] from 2002 to
2007. The authors illustrated their analysis on a simple deterministic While language,
and provided each command of the language a lower bound and an upper bound on
the amount of leakage. Their treatment for loops is very pessimistic, assuming that
all information in the looping conditions will be leaked. Malacaria [80] then showed
a more precise treatment for looping constructs by using the partition property of
entropy. This work is labour intensive and impossible to automate.
In 2009, Smith [110] proposed to use Rényi min-entropy as a metric for QIF, and
showed that the channel capacity of information flow, i.e. the maximum leakage,
measured by this metric is equal to the logarithm of the number of possible outputs.
This result agrees with previous observations of Malacaria and Chen [82] that channel
capacity measured by Shannon entropy also has the same tight upper bound.
Meanwhile, in the same year (2009), Backes, Ko¨pf and Rybalchenko [16] reached an
important milestone by introducing the first automatic technique for QIF analysis
using model checking [46] and Barvinok algorithm [23] for model counting. This
analysis is very expensive, and only applicable to a limited class of programs.
In 2010, Heusser and Malacaria [66] published a paper demonstrating QIF analysis for
programs from Linux kernel. Prior to this paper, all the work on QIF analysis were
demonstrated with small “toy" examples. Heusser and Malacaria made assumptions
that the program had N different possible outputs, and asserted that there did not
exist an output different from those N outputs. Since these assumptions and assertion
required the composition of N+1 copies of the program, their analysis suffers severely
from the state space explosion problem.
A year later, in 2011, Meng and Smith [85] described a fast approximation technique
to compute an upper bound on channel capacity. They infer the relations between all
pairs of bits of the output as a propositional formula, then using a #SAT solver [12]
to count the model. The analysis was largely manual and was demonstrated with toy
examples. The upper bound can be very loose if outputs are sparse and scattered.
In summary, the problem of an automated QIF analysis is still very challenging. A
simpler problem, called bounding QIF, is considered in [117, 66]: deciding if a program
P leaks less than a constant q. In previous work, Yasuoka and Terauchi have proved
that bounding QIF is not a k-safety problem for any k [117]. Cerny et al. then
proved that in the case of Shannon entropy, bounding QIF is PSPACE-complete [35].
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Therefore, QIF and bounding QIF remain a huge challenge. Available techniques are
either inefficient or imprecise. This thesis investigates techniques that improves both
precision and efficiency for QIF analysis.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis is about solving a problem, QIF, using a set of tools referred to as Formal
Methods. Through the process of solving the problem, we also gain the insights to
improve the tools. As a result, this thesis makes contributions both to approaches for
automated QIF analysis using Formal Methods as well as techniques for improving
Formal Methods.
Contributions to Quantitative Information Flow
This thesis makes a theoretical advance by casting the QIF problem into a variant
of the Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problem [54]. This results in a general
algorithm for QIF analysis based on the DPLL(T ) algorithm [90] for SMT. This
theoretical advance leads to practical advance: compared to the work of Heusser and
Malacaria [66], the technique proposed in this thesis dramatically reduces the time of
analysing programs from Linux kernel, from some hours to a few seconds.
The second theoretical contribution of this thesis is to show that classical Symbolic
Execution [74] can be understood as a variant of the DPLL(T ) algorithm. In other
words, Symbolic Executors are SMT solvers. This view enables us to develop the
first QIF analysis tool for Java bytecode, built on top of the Symbolic PathFinder
symbolic execution platform.
Our third contribution is to show the relation between Quantitative Information Flow
and Reliability analysis [37], which are two totally separate research areas prior to
this thesis. This relation leads to the development of an efficient QIF technique based
on an available Reliability analyser.
The practical contribution of this thesis is the development of several QIF analysis
tools for programs in both C and Java, and the experiments of these tools on real-
world programs: C programs from the Linux kernel, a Java tax program from the
European project HATS, and anonymity protocols.
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Contributions to Formal Methods
The insights we have learned from solving the QIF problem lead us to investigate
techniques that could improve Formal Methods. Our first contribution in this thesis
is the introduction of the Model Counting Modulo Theories (or #SMT) problem,
which has several potential applications beyond QIF.
Our second contribution is: from the view of Symbolic Executors as SMT solvers,
we propose a new methodology for Bounded Model Checking based on Symbolic
Execution. Our methodology is naturally parallelizable, thus it can exploit modern
multi-core machines and distributed architecture. Experimental results show that
it outperforms the state-of-the-art Bounded Model Checker CBMC [44] in several
complex case studies.
The third contribution of this thesis is a light weight method for All-Solution SAT
Modulo Theories (All-SMT). Unlike available approaches, our method can be used
for any SMT problem with any ground theories, including bit vectors.
Another contribution of this thesis is two applications of All-SMT solvers: the first
one is to find multiple-counter examples in Bounded Model Checking; the second one
is to combine Bounded Model Checking and All-SMT solver for automated test vector
generation.
1.4 Thesis structure
This thesis can be divided in two parts: the first part includes chapters 3, 6, and
7 focusing on automation of QIF using Formal Methods; the second part includes
chapters 4 and 5 focusing on improving Formal Methods.
Chapter 2 provides necessary preliminaries on the two main concepts in this thesis:
QIF and SMT.
Chapter 3 introduces the #SMT problem as a generalization of the SMT problem,
and casts the QIF problem into #SMT. The result is a general algorithm for QIF
analysis based on the DPLL(T ) algorithm used in SMT solvers.
Chapter 4 shows how Symbolic Execution can be viewed as a variant of the DPLL(T )
algorithm. This view enables one to turn a classical Symbolic Executor into a #SMT
solver for QIF analysis with little effort.
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Chapter 5 presents a new methodology for Concurrent Bounded Model Checking
using classical Symbolic Execution. The effectiveness of the methodology is illustrated
with several complex case studies in both C and Java.
Chapter 6 describes the relation between QIF and Reliability analysis. This relation
is exploited to build an efficient QIF analysis tool for Java bytecode based on an
available Reliability analysis engine.
Chapter 7 presents two lightweight algorithms for #SMT in a pure logic settings,
and three applications of a #SMT/All-SMT solver apart from QIF, namely multiple-
counterexample analysis for Bounded Model Checking, automated test generation
and reliability analysis.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of contributions and discusses possible
directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In order to make the thesis self-contained, this chapter provides some basic notions
and terminology about discrete probability theory, information theory and first-order
theories. We also recall the elements and general concepts of formal methods.
The content of this chapter is synthesized from several sources, e.g. [102, 81, 110,
107, 48, 25, 55, 57]. None of the results in this chapter were discovered by the author
of this thesis ; a couple of proofs for well-known results, e.g. maximal entropy, are
lifted almost verbatim from text books.
2.1 Quantitative Information Flow
Our attacker model is depicted in Figure 2.1. The program P, characterized by a
function f , takes confidential input H, public input L, and produces output O. L may
or may not be controlled by an adversary. The adversary tries to infer information
from H by observing L and O.
Adversary
tries to infer
H from L and O
H
L
Of
Figure 2.1: Attacker Model
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2.1.1 Information Flow and Non-interference
Information flow is the (illegal) transmission of information from a variable H to a
variable O in a given process. The simplest case of information flow is explicit flow (or
direct flow) where the whole or partial value of H is copied directly to O, for example:
O = H + 3;
There are more subtle cases, which are categorized as implicit flow (or indirect flow).
Consider, for example, the program below, which simulates a common password
checking procedure:
if (H == L)
O = true;
else
O = false;
Figure 2.2: A password checking program
H is the password, i.e. the confidential data; L is the public input provided by the user;
O is the observable output, “O = true;” means the password is accepted. Although
H is not directly copied to O, there is still information flow leaked from H → O. This
information is “small”, but one can reveal all information about H if he is allowed to
make enough attempts.
Obviously, information flow from confidential data to observable output is not de-
sirable, which is the motivation of research in secure information flow. Dating back
to the pioneering work of the Dennings in the 1970s [56], secure information flow
analysis has been an active research topic for the last four decades.
A popular security policy that guarantees the absence of information flow leaks is non-
interference [47, 65]. It was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer as a security policy
for a general automaton framework, here we give a definition of non-interference in
language-based settings:
Definition 1 (Non-interference) Suppose a program P takes secret input H, public
input L and produces public output O. P has the non-interference property if and only
if: for all possible pairs of input vector [H1, L1], and [H2, L2]:
L1 = L2 ∧ O1 = P ([H1, L1]) ∧ O2 = P ([H2, L2])⇒ O1 = O2
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where O1 = P ([H1, L1]) denotes that O1 is the result of executing the program P with
the input vector [H1, L1].
We use the two terms "information flow" and "interference" interchangeably, since
information flow from H to O means O is interfered by H. The non-interference policy
guarantees the absence of interference or information flow.
Type system approach to non-interference
There has been a large body of work that has used type systems for validating non-
interference, following the idea of Volpano, Irvine and Smith [114]. Type systems are
fast and they support automated, compositional verification. Moreover, the analysis
is safe, which means if a program is classified as “secure”, then it is actually secure,
there are no false negatives.
However, this approach is not extensible. Even a small modification in the information
flow policy or in the programming language, e.g. adding a new feature, requires a
non-trivial extension of the type system and its soundness proof. This approach also
returns too many false positives, which means secure programs can be classified as
“insecure”. For example, consider again the two examples with a small modification
to make them satisfy non-interference:
O = H - H + 3;
if (H == L)
O = false;
else
O = false;
Typing rules would always classify programs like the above as insecure. Another
tricky case is of programs that leak information in the intermediate states, but sanitize
information at the end, for example:
O = H + 3;
O = 3;
Given that the attacker can only observe the final value of the output O, the program
is secure. However, it would be classified as insecure by type systems.
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Theorem proving approach to non-interference
Another prominent approach for secure information flow is to use theorem proving,
in which non-interference is logically formulated by self-composition [50, 22], as non-
interference itself is not a logical property.
We assume a similar setting as in the case of non-interference: given a program P
that takes secret input H, public input L and producing public output O, we denote
by P1 the same program as P, with all variables renamed: H as H1, L as L1 and O as
O1. Self-composition is expressed in Hoare-style framework as [22]:
{L = L1}P; P1{O = O1} (2.1)
The Hoare triple states that if the precondition L = L1 holds, then after the execution
of P ;P1, the postcondition O = O1 also holds. The purpose of having the copy P1 with
all variables renamed is to have another P to compare with P, so self-composition
is logical formulation of non-interference. Compared to type system approach, the
theorem proving approach is much more precise, returning no false positives.
For example, consider again the password checking program P in Figure 2.2, the
composition of P and its copy P1 is shown in Figure 2.3. By choosing H = L∧H1 6= L1,
if (H == L)
O = true;
else
O = false;
if (H1 == L1)
O1 = true;
else
O1 = false;
Figure 2.3: Self-composition of the password checking program
it is easy to find a counter-example for the Hoare triple in (2.1), such that L = L1
holds and O = O1 does not hold. Therefore, the password checking program violates
non-interference.
Compared to type system approach, the theorem proving approach is much more
precise, returning no false positives. However, it is impractical in reality, as elegantly
put in [113] by Terauchi and Aiken:
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“When we actually applied the self-composition approach, we found that not only are
the existing automatic safety analysis tools not powerful enough to verify many real-
istic problem instances efficiently (or at all), but also that there are strong reasons to
believe that it is unlikely to expect any future advance.”
Terauchi and Aiken also pointed out that the limitations of self-composition come
from the symmetry and redundancy of the self-composed program, which lead to some
partial-correctness conditions that hold between P and P1. To find these conditions
is crucial for the effectiveness of the analysis, however, finding them is in general
impractical. Moreover, the use of an interactive theorem prover requires considerable
user interaction and verification expertise.
2.1.2 Information Theoretical Measurement of Interference
The fact that the password checking program, Figure 2.2, leaks information indicates
that non-interference is over-pessimistic, and often unachievable. Moreover, there are
situations that one needs to decide, between two programs, which one is more secure?
Consider the following program:
if (H >= L)
O = true;
else
O = false;
Obviously this program is much less secure than the one in Figure 2.2, a fact that
cannot be proved with non-interference. These examples show the need of a more
quantitative assessment of information flow: instead of asking “does the program
leak information?”, we would like to know “how much does it leak?” Information
Theory [107] provides the tools to answer this question.
Discrete Probability Theory
We introduce the concepts that are to be used in the construction of an information
theoretical analysis of information flow. A thorough background and description can
be found on standard textbook [58].
Definition 2 (Sample space) The sample space of an experiment, denoted by Ω,
is a countable set of all possible outcomes of that experiment.
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Each outcome is a complete description of the state of the real world as a result of
the experiment. It needs not be a number, e.g. the outcome of tossing a coin is either
“head” or “tail”. Therefore, probability theory needs the following definition:
Definition 3 (Random variable) A random variable is a function X : Ω → N
(N ⊆ R) that associates a real number with each possible outcome in Ω.
Each element x ∈ N is assigned a “probability” value, denoted by p(x) or p(X = x),
which is the measure of the likeliness that X takes the value x.
Definition 4 (Probability distribution) The probability distribution of a random
variable X : Ω→ N is a function p : N → [0, 1] such that:∑
x∈N
p(x) = 1
For discrete probability, the function p is also known as probability mass function. In
this thesis, we are interested in the uniform distribution, in which all the elements
of N have the same probability. This means every outcome of the sample space is
equally likely to occur.
Any subset E ⊆ Ω is refereed to as an event. The probability of an event E is defined
as follows:
p(E) =
∑
ω∈E
p(X(ω))
It is straightforward from the definition of probability distribution that p(Ω) = 1,
which means Ω is an event that always occurs. At other extreme, it is easy to show
that p(∅) = 0, i.e. the empty set is an event that never occurs.
Definition 5 (Conditional Probability) The probability of an event A given that
another event B has occurred is defined as follows:
p(A|B) = p(A ∩B)
p(B)
Definition 6 (Joint Probability) The joint probability mass function of two dis-
crete random variables X, Y is defined as:
p(x, y) = p(X = x and Y = y) = p(y|x) p(x) = p(x|y) p(y)
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Information Theory
Information Theory [107, 48] provides the mathematical foundation to reason about
“information” in a quantitative sense. Its main concept is “entropy”, which measures
the uncertainty about a random variable.
Definition 7 (Entropy) Given a random variable X : Ω → N with the probability
mass function p(x). Shannon entropy is defined as:
F (X) = −
∑
x∈N
p(x) log p(x)
The logarithm is to the base 2 by convention, hence the units are bits. We also write
F (p) for the above quantity.
Lemma 1 Given a random variable X : Ω → N with the probability mass function
p(x), the entropy of X is bounded by:
0 ≤ F (X) ≤ log |N |
where |N | is the cardinality of the set N .
Proof: By definition 0 ≤ p(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ N , which leads to p(x) log p(x) ≤ 0.
As a result, the first part of the lemma F (X) ≥ 0 holds.
The second part of the lemma is proved by using Lagrange multiplier to find the
maximal entropy. For simplicity, we define a system of index for all elements in N as
follows: x1, x2, . . . , xn (which also means |N | = n).
We write pi for p(X = xi), and maximize the function:
f(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi
subject to the condition of probability:
g(p1, p2, . . . , pn) =
n∑
i=1
pi = 1
Lagrange multipliers is used to find the maximum entropy ~p ∗ = {p ∗1 , p ∗2 , . . . , p ∗n}
across all probability distributions ~p = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of X. It is required that:
∂
∂~p
(f + λ(g − 1))
∣∣∣∣
~p=~p ∗
= 0
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This equation is expanded into a system of n equations (i = 1, 2, . . . , n):
∂
∂pi
{
−
(
n∑
j=1
pj log2 pj
)
+ λ
(
n∑
j=1
pj − 1
)}∣∣∣∣∣
pi=p∗i
= 0
Carrying out the differentiation of these n equations results in:
−
(
1
ln 2
+ log2 p
∗
i
)
+ λ = 0
Since the value of p∗i only depends on λ, they are all equal:
p ∗1 = p
∗
2 = . . . = p
∗
n
Moreover, by definition of probability distribution:
n∑
i=1
p ∗i = 1
This leads to:
p ∗1 = p
∗
2 = . . . = p
∗
n =
1
n
The maximal entropy is:
F (p ∗) = −
n∑
1
pi log pi = −
n∑
1
1
n
log
1
n
= n = |N |
This proves the second part Lemma 1: F (X) ≤ log |N |, equality holds when X has
uniform distribution.
Definition 8 (Joint Entropy) Given two random variables X : ΩX → NX and
Y : ΩY → NY , the joint Shannon entropy is defined as follows:
F (X, Y ) = −
∑
x∈NX
∑
y∈NY
p(x, y) log p(x, y)
where p(x, y) is the joint probability mass function of X and Y .
The joint entropy measures how much uncertainty there is in the two random variables
X and Y taken together.
Definition 9 (Conditional Entropy) Given two random variables X : ΩX → NX
and Y : ΩY → NY , the conditional entropy of X given the knowledge of Y is defined
as follows:
F (Y |X) =
∑
x∈NX
p(x)F (Y |X = x)
24
The definition of conditional entropy can be expanded as:
F (Y |X) = −
∑
x∈NX
p(x)
∑
y∈NY
p(y|x) log p(y|x)
= −
∑
x∈NX
∑
y∈NY
p(x, y) log p(y|x)
= −
∑
x∈NX
∑
y∈NY
p(x, y) log
(
p(x, y)
p(x)
)
= −
∑
x∈NX
∑
y∈NY
p(x, y) log p(x, y) +
∑
x∈NX
∑
y∈NY
p(x, y) log p(x)
= F (X, Y ) +
∑
x∈NX
p(x) log p(x)
= F (X, Y )− F (X)
If X and Y are independent, then knowing the value of X does not change uncertainty
about Y , which means F (Y |X) = F (Y ). At the other extreme, if the value of Y is
completely determined by the value of X, then there is no uncertainty about Y when
already knowing X, and F (Y |X) = 0 holds.
Lemma 2 Given two random variables X and Y , the following inequalities hold:
F (X, Y ) ≥ max{F (X), F (Y )}
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that max{F (X), F (Y )} = F (X), we need
to prove:
F (X, Y ) ≥ F (X) ⇐⇒ F (X) + F (Y |X) ≥ F (X) ⇐⇒ F (Y |X) ≥ 0
By definition of conditional entropy, we have F (Y |X) = ∑ p(x)F (Y |X = x). Similar
to the proof of the first part of Lemma 1, we can show that F (Y |X = x) ≥ 0 holds.
As a result, F (Y |X) ≥ 0 also holds. This proves the inequality in Lemma 2. Equality
holds if and only if F (Y |X) = 0 holds, which means the value of Y is completely
determined by the value of X.
Definition 10 (Mutual Information) Given two random variables X : ΩX → NX
and Y : ΩY → NY , the mutual information or mutual dependence between X and Y
is defined as:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y∈NY
∑
x∈NX
p(x, y) log
(
p(x, y)
p(x) p(y)
)
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The mutual information can be rewritten as:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y∈NY
∑
x∈NX
p(x, y) log
(
p(x|y)
p(x)
)
= −
∑
y∈NY
∑
x∈NX
p(x, y) log p(x) +
∑
y∈NY
∑
x∈NX
p(x, y) log p(x|y)
= F (X)− F (X|Y )
Measurement of leakage
In the context of information flow analysis, we are interested in the value of variables
H, L, and O as in our attacker model in Figure 2.1. For each variable, we denote its
sample space and random variable as follows: XH : ΩH → NH , XL : ΩL → NL, and
XO : ΩO → NO.
The random variableXH represents the a priori knowledge of the adversary about the
secret data H. Consider, for example, the password checking program in Figure 2.2: if
the adversary already knows that the password H is “abc”, this means ΩH = {“abc”},
and p(XH(“abc”)) = 1. Or suppose that ΩH contains all possible strings of length up
to 30, but the adversary knows in advance that the victim has the habit to use his
daughter’s name, “Alice”, as password. In this case, in the probability distribution of
XH , the value of p(XH(“Alice”)) is close to 1. The most general case is the adversary
does not have any information about the password, which means XH has a uniform
distribution.
The entropy F (XH) measures the initial uncertainty of the adversary about H. When
the adversary already knows that the password is “abc”, there is no uncertainty at
all. p(XH(“abc”)) = 1 leads to F (XH) = 0. On the other hand, if the adversary has
no information about the password in advance, his uncertainty is maximal.
After an execution of the program P, there is some information about H leaked via
information flow from H to O. As a result, the adversary learns some information, and
reduces his uncertainty about H. The difference in his uncertainties before and after
the observation is the amount of leakage:
leakage = initial uncertainty− remaining uncertainty (2.2)
The remaining uncertainty about H given the knowledge of O is, by definition, the
conditional entropy F (XH |XO). As a result, leakage is calculated as follows:
∆F (XH) = F (XH)− F (XH |XO) = I(XH ;XO)
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In the case of non-interference, O is independent from H, or in other words O is not
interfered by H, F (XH |XO) = F (XH) holds. As a result, the leakage is ∆F (XH) = 0.
∆F (XH) = I(XH ;XO) is always positive. This property can be proved by using
Jensen’s inequality. The interested reader is referred to the textbook by Cover and
Thomas [48] for a proof in details.
2.1.3 Problem Statement
Programs such as the one in our attacker model in Figure 2.1 can be viewed as a
channel, in which (confidential) information flows from the input H to the output O.
The channel capacity C is defined as the maximum amount of information can be
transmitted in this channel. More formally, C is maximum mutual information of
XH and XO over all possible input distributions p of XH .
Theorem 1 (Channel Capacity) Given a program P as a discrete channel from H
to O, the channel capacity C is computed by:
C = log |NO|
Proof: By definition of conditional entropy, the leakage can be rewritten as:
∆F (XH) = F (XH)− F (XH |XO) = F (XH)− (F (XH , XO)− F (XO))
= F (XO)− (F (XH)− F (XH , XO))
From Lemma 2, we have F (XH , XO) ≥ F (XH). This leads to:
∆F (XH) ≤ F (XO)
From Lemma 1: F (XO) ≤ log |NO|, which means ∆F (XH) ≤ log |NO| holds. Equality
holds when both of the equalities in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 hold. Which means
the value of O is completely determined by the value of H, and XO has uniform
distribution.
As such, counting the number of observables is the basis of state-of-the-art QIF
analysis, e.g. [66, 85, 77, 76], and also the basis for this thesis. The channel capacity
theorem also justifies the following:
Definition 11 (The QIF problem) Given a program P, QIF is the problem of
counting N , the number of possible outputs of P.
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2.2 Logical Satisfiability Problems
This section provides some logical concepts used throughout in this thesis. The
interested readers are referred to [25] for more details.
2.2.1 Propositional Satisfiability
Definition 12 (Propositional atom) A propositional atom or Boolean atom is a
statement or assertion that must be true or false.
Examples of Boolean atoms are: “all humans are mortal” and “program P leaks k
bits”. Boolean atoms are the most basic building blocks of propositional formulas,
each Boolean atoms Ai is also a formula.
Propositional formulas are constructed from Boolean atoms using logical connectives :
not (¬), and (∧), or (∨), and imply (→). That means if ϕ1 are ϕ2 are formulas, then
¬ϕ1, ϕ1∧ϕ2, ϕ1∨ϕ2, and ϕ1 → ϕ2 are also formulas. For example, (¬A1∧A2)→ A3
is a propositional formula.
A Boolean atom Ai or its negation ¬Ai is called a literal. We denote by Atom(ϕ) the
set {A1, A2, . . . An} of Boolean atoms that occur in ϕ. The truth of a propositional
formula ϕ is a function of the truth values of the Boolean atoms it contains.
We denote by > and ⊥ the truth values of true and false, respectively.
Definition 13 Given a propositional formula ϕ, a truth assignment µ of ϕ is defined
as a function which assigns each Boolean atom of ϕ a truth value:
µ : Atom(ϕ)→ {>,⊥}
A partial truth assignment of a formula ϕ is a function µ : A → {>,⊥} whereA is any
subset of Atom(ϕ). A (partial) truth assignment µ satisfies a propositional formula
ϕ, denoted by µ |= ϕ , if ϕ is evaluated to > under µ. For example µ : A3 7→ ⊥
satisfies the formula (¬A1 ∧ A2)→ A3.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable if there exists a (partial) truth assignment such that µ |= ϕ.
If µ |= ϕ for every truth assignment µ, then ϕ is valid. Either a formula is valid or
its negation is satisfiable.
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Definition 14 A propositional formula ϕ is in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) if
and only if it is a conjunction of disjunctions of literals:
ϕ =
N∧
i=1
Mi∨
j=1
lij
Any propositional formula can be converted to CNF by an algorithm with worst-case
linear time [99, 28].
Definition 15 (The SAT problem) Given a propositional formula ϕ in CNF, the
Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT) is the problem of finding an assignment µ that
satisfies ϕ.
As the SAT problem is NP-complete, there is no algorithm that efficiently works on
all instances of the problem. However, there are two main families of algorithms for
state-of-the-art SAT solvers: DPLL [52, 51] and Stochastic Local Search [69]. This
thesis focuses on the DPLL algorithm, which will be described in details later in
chapter 4.
2.2.2 Model Counting
Definition 16 (The #SAT problem) Given a propositional formula ϕ, the Model
Counting problem (#SAT) is the problem of counting all the solutions of the SAT
problem.
2.2.3 Satisfiability Modulo Theories
We assume countable sets of variable V , function symbols F and predicate symbols P .
A first-order logic signature is defined as a partial function Σ : F ∪P → A (A ⊂ N).
Each a ∈ A corresponds to the arity of an symbol. Obviously, a 0-ary predicate is a
Boolean atom, and a 0-ary function symbol is called a constant.
A Σ-term τ is either a variable x ∈ V or it is built by applying function symbols in
F to Σ-terms, e.g. f(τ1, . . . , τn) where f ∈ F and Σ(f) = n. For example, f(x, g(x))
is a Σ-term if Σ(f) = 2 and Σ(g) = 1.
Definition 17 If τ1, . . . , τn are Σ-terms, and p ∈ P is a predicate symbol such that
Σ(p) = n, then p(τ1, . . . , τn) is a Σ-atom.
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A Σ-atom or its negation is called Σ-literal. We use the infix equality sign “=” as
a shorthand for the equality predicate. If τ1 and τ2 are Σ-terms, then the Σ-atom
τ1 = τ2 is called Σ-equality. ¬(τ1 = τ2) or τ1 6= τ2 is called Σ-disequality.
Σ-atoms are the most basic building blocks of Σ-formulas, each Σ-atom p(τ1, . . . , τn)
is also a Σ-formula. Similar to the construction of propositional formulas, Σ-formulas
are constructed from Σ-terms which are glued together by universal quantifiers
(∀), existential quantifiers (∃), and logical connectives. That means if ϕ1 and
ϕ2 are Σ-formulas, then ∀x : ϕ1, ∃x : ϕ1, ¬ϕ1, ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, ϕ1 ∨ϕ2, and ϕ1 → ϕ2 are also
Σ-formulas.
A quantifier-free Σ-formula does not contain quantifiers; a sentence is a Σ-formula
without free variables. A first-order theory is defined as follows:
Definition 18 (First-order theory) A first-order theory T is is a set of first-order
sentences with signature Σ.
A Σ-structure M is a triple (|M |,Σ, I) consisting of a non-empty domain |M |, a
signature Σ, and an interpretation I. The interpretation I assigns meanings to
symbols of Σ: for each function symbol f ∈ F such that Σ(f) = n, f is assigned a
n-ary function I(f) on the domain |M |; for each predicate symbol p ∈ P such that
Σ(p) = n, p is assigned a n-ary predicate I(p), represented by a subset of |M |n. For
each variable x ∈ V , I(x) ∈ |M |.
A Σ-structure M is a model of the Σ-theory T if it satisfies all sentences in T . If a
Σ-formula is satisfiable in a model of T , then it is called T -satisfiable.
Henceforth, for simplicity we will omit the prefix “Σ−” from term, atom, formula,
etc. Instead, we will often use the prefix “T -” to denote “in the theory T ”.
We define a bijective function BA (Boolean abstraction) which maps Boolean atoms
into themselves and T -atoms into fresh Boolean atoms. The Boolean refinement
function BR is then defined as the inverse of BA, which means BR = BA−1.
Definition 19 (The SMT problem) Given a theory or a combination of theories
T and a Σ-formula ϕ, the Satisfiability Modulo Theories problem (SMT) is the prob-
lem of deciding T -satisfiability of ϕ.
Most of the work on SMT focus on quantifier-free formulas, and decidable first-order
theories. The SMT problem is NP-hard, as it subsumes the SAT problem.
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Most state-of-the-art SMT solvers implement the DPLL(T ) algorithm, which is the
integration of two components: (i) an enumerator integrating a DPLL-based SAT
solver enumerates truth assignments satisfying the Boolean abstraction of the input
formula; (ii) T -solvers validate the consistency w.r.t. theories T of the (partial)
assignment produced by the SAT solver. The DPLL(T ) algorithm will be described
in more details later in chapter 4.
2.3 The programming language and the program
For simplicity, we illustrate our methodologies using the guarded command language
[60] instead of C or Java. The grammar of the language is depicted in Figure 2.3.
program ≡ stmt∗
stmt s ≡ assume e | assert e | v = e | if e then goto s else goto s
v ∈ Var (variables)
e ∈ Exp (expressions)
Figure 2.4: The guarded command language
In this thesis, we focus on safety properties: note that the two commands assume(c)
and assert(c) are powerful enough to encode expressive temporal properties [45], and
also support assume-guarantee style compositional reasoning. Any program can be
viewed as a system that transits between states. There are many ways to describe
this system depending on how much detail of the program that needs to be captured.
Apart from chapter 4, in this thesis a program P is modelled as a transition system
as follows:
P = (S, I, F, T ) (2.3)
where S is the set of program states; I ⊆ S is the set of initial states; F ⊆ S is the
set of final states; and T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation.
Under this setting, a trace of (a concrete) execution of the program P is represented
by a sequence of states: ρ = s0s1..sk such that s0 ∈ I, sk ∈ F and 〈si, si+1〉 ∈ T for
all i ∈ {0, .., k − 1}.
We define two functions init and fin to get the initial state and final state of ρ:
init(ρ) = s0 and fin(ρ) = sk The semantics of P is then defined as the set R of all
possible traces.
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In the context of the information flow problem, we assume that each initial state
s ∈ I is a pair 〈H,L〉, i.e. I = IH × IL, in which H is the confidential component to
be protected and L is the public component that may be controlled by an attacker.
2.4 Formal Methods
Formal methods refer to a set of mathematical-based techniques used in Computer
Science for the specification and verification of software and hardware systems. These
techniques base their foundations on several conceptual frameworks: automata theory,
logic calculi, formal languages, program semantics and so on.
The act of using formal methods to prove or to disprove the correctness of a system,
with respect to a certain property, is called formal verification. Compared to testing,
formal verification is much more expensive. However, it is crucial in the development
of systems whose failure can cause huge financial lost or even cost human lives. History
has witnessed several computer-related disasters that could have been prevented if
formal verification had been used [46].
There are three main components involving in the formal verification of a hardware
or software system:
• A formal model of the system. Models used in formal verification vary in the
level of abstraction, from an automaton describing status changes of the system,
to source code or machine code of the system.
• A formal specification, often described in a formal languages. These formal
languages also have different power of expressiveness.
• A formal method, implemented in a fully or partially automated tool, to prove
or disprove the conformance of the formal model to the formal specification.
There are three possible cases for the result: the first case is the program conforms to
the specification; the second case is the system violates the specification, in which a
counterexample might be returned; the final case is the tool fails to prove or disprove
within a period of time.
Naturally, there is a trade-off between the level of abstraction of the model and
the expressiveness of the specification. Typically, formal methods-based tools can
check complicated specification on highly abstract models, and simple specification
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in detailed models. In this thesis, the formal model of a program is C source code or
Java bytecode. The formal specification is the reachability of some assertions in the
source code or bytecode. The formal methods we used are Bounded Model Checking
and Symbolic Execution.
2.4.1 Bounded Model Checking and CBMC
The aim of Bounded Model Checking [26] (BMC) is to find bugs or to prove their
absence up to some bounded k number of transitions. Recall that a program P is
modelled as a transition system P = (S, I, F, T ), and a trace is represented by a
sequence of states ρ = s0s1..sk.
A trace can be also seen in logical form: the set I and the relation T can be written
as their characteristic functions: s0 ∈ I iff I(s0) holds; 〈si, si+1〉 ∈ T iff T (si, si+1)
holds. In this way, a trace ρ is represented by the formula:
I(s0) ∧
k−1∧
i=0
T (si, si+1) (2.4)
Clearly the transition system P is a model for such a formula, i.e. P is a model
for all formulas representing traces of the program. As BMC aims to find bugs or
prove their absence up to some bounded k number of transitions, it explores all traces
ρ = s0s1..sk of the program P, in which sk needs not to be in F.
Notice that because of the bound k there are only a finite number of traces to explore.
Hence we can represent the bounded program as a formula C which is a conjunction
of formulas, whose conjoints are possible traces. Notice formulas can also represent
symbolic traces, for example if in a formula the value of a program variable is left
unspecified then there can be several concrete traces satisfying that formula. Formulas
satisfied by set of concrete traces can be referred to as symbolic traces.
CBMC translates a C program into a logical formula C which is then used as a model
for the property P to be verified. The property is verified by the C program iff C ∧P
is valid. This can be checked by a satisfiability solver on C ∧¬P . In fact if C ∧¬P is
true in the model then one trace will satisfy ¬P hence the property is not valid. On
the other hand if C ∧ ¬P is false in the model then no trace will satisfy ¬P hence P
is valid.
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2.4.2 Symbolic Execution and Symbolic PathFinder
Symbolic Execution [74] (SE) is a programming analysis technique which executes
programs on unspecified inputs, by using symbolic inputs instead of concrete data.
For each executed program path, SE builds a path condition which is the condition on
the inputs for the execution to follow that path, according to the branching conditions
in the code.
A path condition pc is initialized as empty, and it doesn’t change when executing
non-branching instructions. For an if statement with condition c, there are three
possible cases: (i) pc ` c: SE chooses the then path; (ii) pc ` ¬c: SE chooses the
else path; (iii) (pc 0 c) ∧ (pc 0 ¬c): SE executes both paths: in the then path, it
updates the path condition pc1 = pc∧c, in the else path it updates the path condition
pc2 = pc ∧ ¬c.
In classical SE, the satisfiability of the path condition is checked at every branching
point, using off-the-shelf constraint solvers. In this way only feasible program paths
are explored. A symbolic execution tree characterizes the execution paths followed
during the symbolic execution of a program. The nodes represent program (symbolic)
states and the arcs represent transitions between states.
Symbolic PathFinder (SPF) is a SE framework built on top of the Java PathFinder
(JPF) model checking tool-set for Java bytecode analysis. It implements a bytecode
interpreter that replaces the standard, concrete execution semantics of bytecodes with
a non-standard symbolic execution.
SPF implements classical SE, in its default mode SPF only explores feasible symbolic
paths. However, it also has an option to run without constraint solving, which means
for an if statement with condition c, both pc 0 c and pc 0 ¬c are assumed to be
true. As a result of this option, SPF will explore all the possible paths (feasible and
infeasible) through the program, up to the given bound. This particular option will
be used later in chapter 5 for the design of a concurrent bounded model checker.
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Chapter 3
Model Counting Modulo Theories
This chapter introduces the #SMT problem and a #SMT-based technique for QIF
analysis, which provides a dramatic improvement on state-of-the-art implementations
of QIF analysis. On the theoretical side, this work establishes a connection between
fundamental verification algorithms and QIF. This connection is exploited to mitigate
the state explosion problem by developing a novel approach for QIF based on SMT.
More specific contributions are:
1. Introduction of a new research problem, Model Counting Modulo Theories or
#SMT, and its applications to QIF.
2. A framework, called #DPLL(T ), to build a solver for #SMT-based QIF.
3. A prototyping tools for QIF analysis: sqifc built on top of CBMC [44].
4. Analysis of complex code, including recent vulnerabilities from the National
Vulnerability Database of the US government [6] and anonymity protocols.
3.1 Illustrative Example
To illustrate our approach, consider the data sanitization program P from [89, 85],
shown in Figure 3.1. It is straightforward to show that only integer values from 8 to
23 are possible outputs of this program. An attacker has hence available 16 possible
output observations: observing outputs 9 .. 23 will know the secret H is 1 .. 15 and
observing 8 will know the secret is 0 or greater than 15. Assuming the attacker has no
prior knowledge of the secret H apart that is a 32 bits variable his a-priori probability
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L = 8;
if (H < 16)
O = H + L;
else
O = L;
Figure 3.1: Data sanitization
of guessing the value of H in one try is 1
232
, and the expected probability of guessing
the secret in one try after observing the outputs is:
15
232
+
232 − 15
232
1
232 − 15 =
15
232
+
1
232
=
16
232
We can measure the leakage of the program as the difference (of the − log base 2)
between the probability of guessing the secret before and after observing the outputs
of the program; in this case:
− log( 1
232
)− (− log 16
232
) = log(16) = 4
The result of this measurement, log(16) = log (number of output observations), is
an alternative explanation for theorem 1, i.e. theorem of channel capacity, that we
have proved in the previous chapter. Our goal is to develop an efficient automated
technique to compute this number of output observations.
Notice that the output O is stored in the computer memory as a string of 32 bits
b1b2 . . . b32, which can be represented by a set of Boolean variables VI = {p1, p2, . . . p32}
such that pi = > if and only if bi is 1, and pi = ⊥ if and only if bi = 0. Thus, each
possible value of O corresponds to a truth assignment for VI . For example, O = 1000b
corresponds to: p1 7→ ⊥, p2 7→ ⊥, p3 7→ ⊥, p4 7→ >, p5 7→ ⊥, . . . , p32 7→ ⊥.
Since there are 16 possible values of O from 8 to 23, there are 16 possible truth
assignments for VI . We can view these truth assignments as partial models of a
logical satisfiability problem on a logical formula ϕP . Obivously, this formula ϕP
characterizes the behaviour of the program P because of the correspondence between
a possible output of P and a partial model of ϕP .
Our goal is to count all possible values of O, which corresponds to counting all models
of ϕP with respect to the set VI . In other words, we cast the problem of measuring
information leaks of P to a model counting problem on ϕP . In the next sections, we
will give a formal definition for this problem, which we name Model Counting Modulo
Theories, and develop an algorithm for QIF analysis based on it.
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3.2 Model Counting Modulo Theories
In the previous chapter, we have recalled three logical satisfiability problems that
have been studied extensively in recent years, namely SAT, #SAT, and SMT. Their
relations with each other are depicted in Figure 3.2. Since propositional logic is a
special case of first-order theories whose signature contains only 0-ary predicates, the
SAT problem is a simple case of the SMT problem. Moreover, the #SAT problem is
a generalization of the SAT problem from finding one model to counting all models.
What is lacking in this big picture is a satisfiability problem that is a generalization of
#SAT to first-order theories, and is a generalization of SMT from finding one model
to counting all models.
SAT
generalize to first-order theories
#SAT
SMT
generalize to
counting models
?
generalize to first-order theories
generalize to
counting models
Figure 3.2: Logical satisfiability problems
Note that it is not always possible to count models in SMT as most SMT theories
permit an infinite number of models. For example, there are uncountably infinite
models for the formula: ϕ = A ∧ (x > 1), where the background theory T is LA(Q),
the theory of linear arithmetic over the rationals, which means x ∈ Q.
Here we restrict the problem to counting all models with respect to a set of Boolean
variables. This restriction guarantees that there are always finite number of models
regardless of the background theories.
Definition 20 (The #SMT problem) Given a theory or a combination of theo-
ries T and a Σ-formula ϕ, the Model Counting Modulo Theories problem (#SMT) is
the problem of counting all models M of T with respect to a set of Boolean variables
VI such that ϕ is T -satisfiable in M .
37
SAT
generalize to first-order theories
#SAT
SMT
generalize to
counting models
#SMT
generalize to first-order theories
generalize to
counting models
Figure 3.3: Logical satisfiability problems
With this new #SMT problem, our picture of logical satisfiability problems in Figure
3.3 is now complete. The #SMT problem is a generalization of both the #SAT
problem and the SMT problem.
Recall that most state-of-the-art SMT solvers are the integration of two components:
(i) an enumerator integrating a SAT solver enumerates truth assignments satisfying
the Boolean abstraction of the input formula; (ii) T -solvers validate the consistency
w.r.t. theories T of the (partial) assignment produced by the SAT solver.
Naturally, an SMT solver can be extended into a #SMT solver by replacing the SAT
solver with a #SAT solver that can explicitly enumerate all models.
3.3 Quantitative Information Flow as #SMT
We assume the setting in our attacker model in Figure 2.1: a program P that takes
secret input H, public input L and producing public output O. As per definition 11, the
quantitative information flow problem is to count the number N of possible values of
the output O, which is an M -bit data b1b2 . . . bM .
Assuming that we have a (first-order) formula ϕP with the following properties: (i)
ϕP contains a set of Boolean variables VI := {p1, p2, .., pM}; (ii) pi = > if and only if
bi is 1, and pi = ⊥ if and only if bi = 0. Under these settings, the QIF problem of
counting N can be viewed as a #SMT problem on the formula ϕP and the set VI of
Boolean variables.
Under this view, on one hand we have a program P to perform QIF analysis, and a tool
box of formal methods. On the other hand, we have a logical formula ϕP to compute
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#SMT and the DPLL(T ) algorithm. Hence, there are two possible approaches to
our QIF problem: the first one is to construct such a formula ϕP from the program
P, then solving it with an #SMT solver; the second one is to use formal methods in
a way that mimics the DPLL(T ) algorithm.
P ϕP
QIF #SMT
Formal methods DPLL(T )
The first approach is more intuitive. However, it is also more complicated, since there
is no available off-the-shelf #SMT solver. Therefore, we will leave it for chapter 7.
In this chapter, we will explore the second approach, which is much simpler yet
powerful enough to analyse real-world programs, and outperform dramatically the
state-of-the-art technique.
An extremely naive technique for QIF using formal methods is to check each number
one by one if it can be a value of the output O. This can be done as follows:
N = 0
for all v from 0 to 2M do
if (assert O != v is violated)
N ← N + 1
end for
return N
We make an assertion that the output O is always different from v, then checking the
validity of this assertion using formal methods. If the assertion is valid, then v is not
a possible value of O. On the contrary, if the assertion is violated, then O can take the
value v, and we increase the counter.
Assuming that we have a very powerful tool that can verify each assertion in one
second, the procedure would take around 232 seconds, which is approximately 136
years. Therefore, this technique is impractical. The reason is that it checks one
concrete value at a time, and thus it is vulnerable to the state-space explosion problem.
Although this technique is naive, it inspires us to develop a procedure to process
multiple values at a time.
Consider again the set of Boolean variables VI := {p1, p2, .., pM}, for example the
partial truth assignment µ = {p1 7→ >, p2 7→ ⊥} represents 2M−2 concrete values: all
the bit configurations over M bits where the first bit is 1 and the second bit is 0.
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Thus, if we can verify that ϕP cannot be satisfiable in µ, we can ignore those 2
M−2
values. Although for this approach we do not construct the formula ϕP , checking
that ϕP cannot be satisfiable in µ can be done by using formal methods to check the
assertion that ¬(b1 = 1 && b2 = 0) is valid.
So a partial truth assignments of VI is a symbolic representation for a set of values
of the output O. Based on this, we develop a technique, called Symbolic Quantitative
Information Flow that mimics the DPLL(T ) algorithm and explores the state space.
Recall that DPLL(T ) algorithm consists of a DPLL-based SAT solver to enumerate
(partial) truth assignments, and a T -solver to check the consistency of these truth
assignment. As we use formal methods, in particular model checking, to check if the
formula ϕP can be satisfiable in a partial truth assignment µ, the model checker plays
the role of the T -solver.
P ϕP
Model Checker T -solver
3.4 Symbolic Quantitative Information Flow
Our first step is to construct the set of Boolean variables VI that we have described.
In a language that supports bitwise operators such as C/C++ and Java, this can be
done by instrumenting the program P as follows:
for all i from 1 to M do
bi = (O >> (i - 1)) & 1
if (bi == 1)
pi ← >
else
pi ← ⊥
end for
Figure 3.4: Program instrumentation
This instrumentation guarantees that the variable pi corresponds to the i
th bit of the
output O. A high level framework to explore the state-space and quantify the leaks
of confidential data is described by the procedures SymbolicQIF and SymCount in
Figure 3.5 and 3.6.
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function SymbolicQIF(VI , ϕP )
Ψ = , pc = , N = 0, i = 1
EarlyPrunning(VI)
SymCount(VI , Ψ, ϕP , N, pc, i)
return Ψ , log2(N)
Figure 3.5: Symbolic QIF analysis
1: function SymCount(VI , Ψ, ϕP , N, pc, i)
2: if (N ≥ 2k) return Insecure
3: Extract pi from VI
4: pc1 ← pc ∧ pi
5: if (T -solver(ϕP , pc1))
6: if (i == M)
7: Ψ ← Ψ ∪ {pc1}
8: N ← N + 1
9: else
10: SymCount(VI , Ψ, ϕP , N, pc1, i+ 1)
11: pc2 ← pc ∧ ¬pi
12: if (T -solver(ϕP , pc2))
13: if (i == M)
14: Ψ ← Ψ ∪ {pc2}
15: N ← N + 1
16: else
17: SymCount(VI , Ψ, ϕP , N, pc2, i+ 1)
Figure 3.6: Symbolic counting for QIF
41
VI , Ψ, ϕP and N are passed by reference, while pc and i are passed by value. VI
is the symbolic representation of the output described in the previous section, ϕP
is the formula representing the program P and Ψ is the set of models of ϕP . N is
the cardinality of Ψ , and the procedure SymbolicQIF returns log2(N) as the channel
capacity.
M is the size of the output data type, e.g. M = 32 if O is a 32-bit integer, and i
is the depth of the recursive call. The parameter pc is a partial assignment of VI , it
is incrementally updated when the search progresses. In SymCount, T -solver(ϕP , pc)
means the T -solver is called to check if there is a model of ϕP where pc is (assigned
to) >.
We illustrate the algorithm SymCount by running it on a simple example (we ignore
temporarily lines 2 and 3 that will be clarified in section 3.5). Consider again the case
study of the data sanitization program in Figure 3.1. Only integer values from 8 to
23 are possible outputs of this program, which means the number of possible outputs
is N = 16.
At the beginning, all variables are initialised in the procedure SymbolicQIF as in
Figure 3.5, the method EarlyPrunning employs a heuristic that will be discussed
later in this section. The method SymCount is then called to count the number of
possible models of ϕP .
When a variable pi ∈ VI is selected, we systematically explore in the same way for
both pi and ¬pi. Hence, the block of code from line 4 to line 10, and the one from
line 11 to line 17 in Figure 4 are symmetric: we only explain the first one.
A partial run of SymCount on the illustrative example is depicted in Figure 3.7. At
the first call of SymCount: i = 1, the variable p1 is in consideration and it is added
to pc in line 4. Since pc is initialised to be empty, pc1 = p1. The T -solver is called
to check if there is a model of ϕP where p1 is (assigned to) >. This can be done by
using assertion to check the validity of ¬p1 in a program as follows:
assert !p1;
A model checking tool like JPF or CBMC can be used as a T -solver to verify this
assertion and it will return > if the assertion fails, and False otherwise. In this
example, the T -solver would return > since p1 stands for “first bit is 1” and all odd
values from 9 to 23 are possible outputs satisfying the condition p1. Hence, SQIF
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UNSAT
p1
p1 ∧ p2
p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3
p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p4
p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p4 ∧ p5p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p4 ∧ ¬p5
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
Figure 3.7: Partial exploration path of SQIF for the program from Figure 3.1.
proceeds by calling SymCount with i = 2. Similarly, the procedure progresses until
calling SymCount with i = 5, which means it needs to verify:
assert !(p1 && p2 && p3 && p4 && p5);
This time the T -solver would return False, since p1 ∧ p2.. ∧ p5 represents a set of
outputs of which each element is at least 20 + 21 + .. + 24 = 31, while the possible
range of O is only from 8 to 23. For a program with an output of 32-bits, by using
EarlyPrunning, SQIF trims a set of 227 concrete values represented by the family of
sets:
{VI := {p1, p2, .., p32} : p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p4 ∧ p5}
This is how the state-space explosion problem is mitigated.
At the depth i = 5 as above, if SQIF takes the path of ¬p5 from line 11, then the
T -solver returns > (O = 15 is one of the models). Hence, the procedure continues
with i = 6, and from this point until i = 32, only the path of ¬pi is SAT. At i = 32,
SQIF finds a full path 00..01111 which represents an output O = 15. This path is
added to Ψ , and SQIF increases N . Finally, at the end of the method SymbolicQIF,
we have Ψ = {8, 9, .., 23} and N = 16, thus we can conclude that the data sanitization
program in Figure 3.1 leaks at most 4 bits.
The method EarlyPrunning implements the idea that if p1 is unsatisfiable, then p1∧C
is also unsatisfiable for any C. Therefore, at the beginning of the SymbolicQIF, all
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pi are checked for satisfiability, and the results are stored for later use. We note that
EarlyPrunning speeds up SymbolicQIF dramatically when the number of possible
models (outputs of the program) is small.
We have developed a prototyping tool for QIF analysis of C programs, sqifc built on
top of CBMC.
3.5 Soundness and Completeness
By soundness of the SQIF approach we mean that given Ψ , log2(N) returned by
SymbolicQIF(VI , ϕP ), each element of Ψ is a model of ϕP i.e. corresponds to a
possible value of the output of the program P . By completeness of SQIF, we mean
that Ψ is the set of all models of ϕP i.e. all values of the output of P .
Theorem 2 Given a sound (resp. complete) T -solver the SQIF approach is sound
(resp. complete) i.e. SymCount solves the QIF problem (Definition 11).
Proof sketch 1 The SQIF algorithm as described in Figure 3.6 is based on DPLL
which itself is a depth-first search procedure. As the search space is a binary tree with
bounded depth M , the number of bits of the output, the depth-first search procedure
is complete. The soundness of SQIF is guaranteed by the soundness of the T -solver,
i.e. model checker.
In reality T -solvers are only complete in particular domains. Moreover, even with
sound and complete T -solvers, a large leak requires an exponential number of calls
to the T -solver and so in practice SQIF is complete only for programs with small
leaks. Since our tools are based on bounded model checker , we choose to analyse
only bounded programs. Notice however that Theorem 2 holds for general T -solvers.
Because of these practical issues about completeness, it has been proposed to shift
the focus from the question “How much does it leak?" to the simpler quantitative
question “Does it leak more than k?" [66, 117]. This approach not only makes the
problem easier to analysis, but it is also more intuitive in term of security, because the
user policy, i.e. threshold k, is encoded in the analysis. The ultimate goal of security
analysis is to determine whether a program is secure or insecure. As discussed in the
previous section, the goal of QIF is to relax security policy from non-interference to
an acceptable threshold k bits of interference, so that we can tolerate “small" leak,
and accept more programs as secure. The SQIF approach can also be used in the
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same way: with a user policy k, if SQIF finds out more than k = 2k possible outputs,
we can stop the procedure and conclude that the program is insecure. This is the
meaning of lines 2 and 2 of function SymCount in Figure 4.
A straightforward consequence of the Theorem 2 is that, assuming a sound T -solver,
given a user policy k, SymCount never returns secure for a program leaking more than
k bits. This can be formally expressed as:
Corollary 1 SQIF is sound w.r.t a user policy k.
3.6 Evaluation
Only few papers present QIF static code analysis of real-world applications: examples
are [66], [77] and the more recent [76]. Of these three approaches, [77] uses a different
attacker model, namely cache side-channels and so is not directly comparable with
our approach. The other two, [66] and [76], use the same attacker model as we do
but are at the moment both restricted to C programs, and hence only comparable to
sqifc. We will concentrate on [66], to which we refer as selfcomp, because it is based
on the well-known concept of self-composition [22]. For the analysis of anonymity
protocols, we compare sqifc against QUAIL [8, 27], a state-of-the-art quantitative
analyser for probabilistic programs. The case studies broadly fall in three categories:
• the first category, consisting of case studies from the National Vulnerability
Database of the US government [6], is aimed to demonstrate how our analysis
is able to deal with complex C-code,
• the CRC case study shows the applicability to quantify leakage in applications
which leak by design,
• the case studies Grade and Dining cryptos protocols show how our technique,
even if it is unable to analyse probabilistic programs, is able to computing
channel capacity for anonymity protocols.
The experiments are conducted on a desktop machine with Intel Core i5 3.3GHz and
8GB of memory.
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3.6.1 CVE-2011-2208
This case study is an example of a program that leaks information when the attacker
can control the public input. It is taken from the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) of the US government [6], and it is released on 13/06/2012.
1 int osf_getdomainname(char __user *name , int namelen)
2 {
3 unsigned len;
4 int i, error;
5
6 error = verify_area(VERIFY_WRITE , name , namelen );
7 if (error)
8 goto out;
9
10 len = namelen;
11 if (namelen > 32)
12 len = 32;
13
14 down_read (& uts_sem );
15 for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
16 __put_user(system_utsname.domainname[i],
17 name + i);
18 if (system_utsname.domainname[i] == ’\0’)
19 break;
20 }
21 up_read (& uts_sem );
22 out:
23 return error;
24 }
Figure 3.8: arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
The system call osf_getdomainname, depicted in Figure 3.8, in the Linux kernel
before 2.6.39.4 leaks sensitive information from kernel memory. This is caused by an
integer signedness error: the signed parameter namelen is assigned to the unsigned
variable len in line 10, so a negative value can be transformed into a big positive one.
Therefore, although the condition in line 11 restricts namelen to 32, the number of
characters returned to the user via the structure name may be much greater including
bytes from kernel memory.
In order to quantify the information leakage caused by this vulnerability, we chose
the thresholds of security policy k = 64 and k = 256, which means the program is
secure if it leaks less than 6 and 8 bits respectively. After the times in Figure 3.11 ,
sqifc and selfcomp conclude that the program is insecure. We then apply the patch
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provided for this vulnerability, and run sqifc again. This time, sqifc found only one
possible value for name, which means a leak of zero bit. Hence, we prove that the
patch fixed the leak.
3.6.2 CVE-2011-1078
This case study is also taken from NVD, and it is released on 21/06/2012. The
function sco_sock_getsockopt_old in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39, depicted in
Figure 3.9, leaks sensitive information from kernel memory.
1 static int sco_sock_getsockopt_old(
2 struct socket *sock , int optname ,
3 char __user *optval , int __user *optlen)
4 {
5 struct sock *sk = sock ->sk;
6 struct sco_conninfo cinfo;
7 int len , err = 0;
8 ...
9
10 lock_sock(sk);
11
12 switch (optname) {
13 case SCO_OPTIONS:
14 ...
15
16 case SCO_CONNINFO:
17 ...
18
19 cinfo.hci_handle = sco_pi(sk)->conn ->hcon ->handle;
20 memcpy(cinfo.dev_class ,
21 sco_pi(sk)->conn ->hcon ->dev_class , 3);
22
23 len = min_t(unsigned int , len , sizeof(cinfo ));
24 if (copy_to_user(optval , (char *)&cinfo , len))
25 err = -EFAULT;
26 break;
27 ...
28 }
29
30 release_sock(sk);
31 return err;
32 }
Figure 3.9: net/bluetooth/sco.c
As in line 24, cinfo is copied to the user. Although its total size is 5 bytes, and all
bytes are correctly assigned, when compiled it includes an additional padding byte
47
for alignment purposes. This padding byte is not zeroed out, and hence it contains
kernel memory, and is leaked to the user. Results of the analysis for k = 8 and k = 64,
are shown in Figure 3.11.
3.6.3 Cyclic Redundancy Check
The program in Figure 3.10 performs Cyclic Redundancy Check1 (CRC) and shifts
right the result sft bits. We also have a Java version of the program to test with
jpf-qif.
unsigned char GetCRC8(
unsigned char check , unsigned char ch)
{
int i, sft ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i++ ) {
if ( check & 0x80 ) {
check <<=1;
if ( ch & 0x80 ) { check = check | 0x01;}
else { check =check & 0xfe; }
check = check ^ 0x85;
} else {
check <<=1;
if ( ch & 0x80 ) { check = check | 0x01; }
else { check = check & 0xfe; }
}
ch <<=1;
}
check >>= sft;
return check;
}
Figure 3.10: Cyclic Redundancy Check
We quantify the amount of information of the confidential input ch revealed by ob-
serving the output of function GetCRC8. We analyse this program with sqifc and
selfcomp for sft values of 3 and 5 giving a maximum leakage for this program of
5 (selfcomp times out on this case) and 3 bits respectively which is consistent with
the design of the program. Results of the analysis are shown in Figure 3.11. In the
case value of sft is 5, i.e. k = 8, selfcomp is faster as the state-space is still small
enough, and selfcomp requires only one call to CBMC. When sft = 3, i.e. k = 32,
the state-space explosion makes selfcomp fail to solve. SQIF requires several calls
to the solver, but it is less vulnerable to state-space explosion.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclic_redundancy_check
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Case Study Policy LoC sqifc time selfcomp time
Data Sanitization - < 10 11.898 timed out
CVE-2011-2208 64 > 200 22.759 119.117
CVE-2011-2208 256 88.196 timed out
CVE-2011-1078 8 > 200 10.380 13.853
CVE-2011-1078 64 37.899 timed out
CRC 8 < 30 1.209 0.498
CRC 32 8.657 timed out
Figure 3.11: Comparing sqifc against selfcomp. Times are in seconds, timeout is 30
minutes. In the first case study, “-” means the policy is not specified.
3.6.4 The Grade Protocol
This case study was used to illustrate protocol analysis in [72, 27]. This anonymity
protocol is designed to enable a group of students to compute the sum of their
grades (e.g., to compute the average) without revealing individual grades. We de-
note S1, ..., Sk be the k students arranged in a ring, each one is given a secret grade gi
between 0 and m−1. To compute the sum of gi without disclosing them, the students
produce k random numbers between 0 and n = (m − 1)k + 1 such that the number
ri is known only to the students Si and S(i+1)%k. Each student si then outputs a
number di = gi + ri − r(i+1)%k and the sum of all grades is equivalent to the sum of
the outputs modulo n.
This protocol is implemented as a probabilistic program in both [72] and [27]. Here
we implement it in standard ANSI C with the built-in non-deterministic functions of
CBMC. The source code, shown on Figure 3.12, is based on the one provided in [27].
The array h[S] stores the grades of all students, i.e. the secret. The attacker can
observe sum % n.
To compare QUAIL with our tool, sqifc, we repeat the experiment of the authors
for the grade protocol with the tool and examples provided in [8]. However, QUAIL
timed out after 1 hours for most of the cases, as showed in Figure 3.14 (we had the
same results of leakage with the authors in the cases the tool did not time out).
Therefore, we take the result in Figure 3.13 directly from the paper [27]. Comparing
the results in Figure 3.13, it is easy to realise that the bounds on the leaks, measured
by sqifc, do not exceed the real leaks, measured by QUAIL, by more than 1 bit,
while sqifc required no more than 1 minutes in all cases as showed in Figure 3.14.
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1 int func (){
2 size_t S = 5, G = 5, i = 0, j = 0;
3 size_t n = ((G-1)*S)+1, sum = 0;
4 size_t numbers[S], announcements[S], h[S];
5
6 for (i = 0; i < S; i++) h[i] = nondet_int () % G;
7
8 for (i = 0; i < S; i++)
9 numbers[i] = nondet_int () % n;
10
11 while (i<S) {
12 j=0;
13 while (j<G) {
14 if (h[i]==j)
15 announcements[i] =
16 (j+numbers[i]-numbers [(i+1)%S])%n;
17 j=j+1;
18 }
19 i=i+1;
20 }
21
22 for (i = 0; i < S; i++)
23 sum += announcements[i];
24
25 return sum % n;
26 }
Figure 3.12: The Grade protocol
Tool QUAIL sqifc
Students 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
G
ra
d
e
s 2 1.500 1.811 2.030 2.198 1.585 2.000 2.322 2.585
3 2.197 2.525 2.745 2.910 2.322 2.807 3.170 3.459
4 2.655 2.984 3.201 3.365 2.807 3.322 3.700 4.000
5 2.999 3.325 3.541 timed out 3.170 3.700 4.087 4.392
Figure 3.13: Leakage measured by QUAIL and sqifc
Tool QUAIL sqifc
Students 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
G
ra
d
e
s 2 1.306 241.483 - - 5.657 7.029 10.767 9.469
3 28.613 - - - 9.145 11.597 17.987 20.930
4 508.313 - - - 10.095 16.872 21.869 18.579
5 - - - - 14.639 20.666 33.298 40.399
Figure 3.14: Elapsed time in seconds of QUAIL and sqifc
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3.6.5 The Dining cryptos protocol
This case study is a variation of the dining cryptographers protocol of Chaum [36],
one of the most popular problem in anonymity protocol. There is a group of cryp-
tographers gathering around a table for dinner. After the meal, they are informed
that the bill has been paid by someone, who could be one of them or the National
Security Agency (NSA). Even though the cryptographers respect each other’s right
to make an anonymous payment, they want to find out whether the NSA paid. To
determine this, they use a protocol as follows: each pair of adjacent cryptographers
toss a coin hidden from everybody else, so that each cryptographer only knows the
values of the coin shared with the one on his left and with the one on his right; then
each cryptographer declares aloud the exclusive OR of the two coins he sees, i.e. 0 if
they have the same value and 1 otherwise. However if the payer is one of the cryp-
tographers, he declares the opposite. In the end, if the sum of all declared values is
even, then it is concluded that the NSA paid the bill. On the other hand, the sum is
odd means one of the cryptographers did it.
1 size_t func (){
2
3 size_t N = 5, output = 0, i = 0;
4 size_t coin[N], obscoin [2], decl[N];
5 size_t h;
6
7 h = nondet_uchar () % (N+1);
8
9 for (i = 0; i < N; i++){
10 coin[i] = nondet_uchar () % 2;
11 }
12
13 for (i = 0; i < N; i++){
14 decl[i] = coin[i] ^ coin[(i+1)%N];
15 if (h==i+1){
16 decl[i] = !decl[i];
17 }
18 i = i+1;
19 }
20
21 for (i = 0; i < N; i++){
22 output = output + decl[c];
23 }
24
25 return output;
26 }
Figure 3.15: The Dining cryptos protocol
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We are interested in knowing how much information about the payer can be leaked by
the sum of all declared values (in the dining cryptographers the observation are the
declared values instead). The input code for the protocol is depicted in Figure 3.15. h
is the identity of the payer, i.e. the secret, output is the observable. The coin toss is
modelled by a built-in non-deterministic function in line 10. This model is less precise
than implementation in probabilistic programs where it is possible to select random
values from a specific distribution. By modelling with non-deterministic function
and computing channel capacity, we can only compute the maximum leakage in all
possible distributions. Figure 3.16 shows the channel capacity computed by sqifc,
and the time to compute them.
Cryptos 3 4 5 6 100 300
Channel capacity 2 2.32 2.59 2.81 6.658 8.234
Time in seconds 2.145 3.496 3.632 18.634 158.517 3326.915
Figure 3.16: The dining cryptos protocol analysed by sqifc
3.7 Discussion of related work
Meng and Smith introduce an approximate technique to calculate an upper bound
on channel capacity in [85]. The authors’ implementation of the method is largely
manual, and we proposed an automation for it in [98]. While the work of Meng and
Smith is very inspiring, the technique can be very imprecise, for example when the
leaks are sparse in the state space. Moreover, the user policy is not encoded in the
analysis which makes it infeasible when the leaks are not small. Take an example of
a program that leaks all 32 bits of integral confidential data, it needs to make 64 calls
to STP solver to determine that all bits are Non-fixed. Then, in order to determine
two bit patterns of (31*32)/2 = 496 pairs of Non-fixed bits, it needs to make another
496 * 4 = 1984 calls to STP solver, so it is 2048 calls in total.
The first automated method for QIF was proposed by Backes et al. [16]. The method
can be divided into two stages: first, it employs model checking to compute an equiva-
lence relationR on the set of confidential inputs w.r.t. observable outputs; secondly, if
this relation R can be represented by a system of linear integer inequalities Ax¯ > b¯,
which means it is a bounded integer polytopes, then a variant of Barvinok’s algo-
rithm [23] can be used to count the number of integer solutions of R. While this
work is important as the first effort on automation of QIF analysis, it is not clear
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however how this approach can be applied to real-world programs because of, for
example, bit-wise operators in the CRC case study or non-linear relations and so on.
Closer to our work is the paper of selfcomp [66] discussed in the previous section.
However, as already outlined their approach to address the question "Does it leak
more than k?" is quite different from ours. Ko¨pf et al. [77] also apply QIF to real-
world applications, i.e. leakage of cache side-channels; their technique is based on
abstract interpretation and hence not based on bounded models. Because of this
however they over-approximate channel capacity.
A preliminary version of this chapter has been presented first in a workshop [98],
and then in a conference [95]. However our definition for #SMT was a little bit
different from the one in this chapter: we required that each of the Boolean variables
in the set VI is a Boolean abstraction of some T -atom, hence we named the problem
Propositional Abstract Model Counting. This requirement makes the definition more
complicated and less general.
A recent paper [76] explores QIF in a pure logical framework. The approach is
powerful and elegant, however it is more limited when compared to our approach as
it relies on the solver to generate models whereas our approach can use any solver
instead. For example we can analyse Java by using JPF as a solver for bytecode even
if JPF doesn’t generate a model in the sense of [76].
McCamant and Ernst released FlowCheck [83], a tool for security testing based on
dynamic taint analysis. What FlowCheck measures is the number of tainted bits,
not an information-theoretic bound, so it is significantly different from our approach.
Another tool is described in [89], it is able to analyse large programs using the notion
of channel capacity in the context of dynamic taint analysis, while our approach
is based on verification techniques. In this sense, our work comes with stronger
theoretical guarantees.
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Chapter 4
Symbolic Execution as DPLL
Modulo Theories
The previous chapter has introduced the Symbolic Quantitative Information Flow
(SQIF) approach, which mimics the DPLL(T ) algorithm. SQIF was implemented on
top of the Bounded Model Checker CBMC, used as a sub-routine, and can analyse
programs written in C/C++. This chapter presents an alternative implementation
for the SQIF approach, using Symbolic Execution.
The implementation is based on a key observation that Symbolic Execution can be
viewed as a variant of the DPLL(T ) algorithm, or in other words, Symbolic Executors
are SMT solvers.
This view enables us to modify Symbolic PathFinder [101], a Symbolic Executor for
Java bytecode, into a QIF analysis tool, jpf-qif, with little effort. The work in this
chapter is the first to use Symbolic Execution for QIF analysis, and jpf-qif is the first
QIF analysis tool for Java.
4.1 Introduction
Symbolic Execution (SE) [74] is now popular. It is increasingly used not only in
academic settings but also in industry, such as in Microsoft, NASA, IBM and Fujitsu
[33]. In the success of SE, the efficiency of SMT solvers [54] is a key factor. In fact,
while SE was introduced more than three decades ago, it had not been made practical
until research in SMT made significant advances [33].
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Recall that most state-of-the-art SMT solvers, e.g. [53, 30], implement the DPLL(T )
algorithm [90] which is an integration of two components as the following. The first
component is a DPLL-based SAT solver, to search on the Boolean skeleton of the
formula. The second component is a T -solver to check the consistency w.r.t. the
theory T of conjunctions of literals. The path conditions generated by a Symbolic
Executor, e.g. Symbolic PathFinder (SPF) [100], are also conjunctions of literals.
Therefore, when an SMT solver checks such a path condition, only the T -solver
works on it, and the SAT component is not used1.
On the other hand, a classical Symbolic Executor [74] can also be divided into two
components. The first component, called Boolean Executor hereafter, executes the
instructions, and updates the path condition. The second component is a T -solver
(since the SAT solver is not used) to validate the consistency of the path condition.
This thesis shows that a Boolean Executor does the same work as DPLL algorithm.
Thus, SE is a variant of DPLL(T ). This view is important since it connects two
communities and can give an insight for future research.
4.2 Illustration of DPLL(T )
A complete formal description of the DPLL(T ) algorithm can be found in, e.g., [90].
Here we briefly recall some background via a running example as follows.
ϕ := (¬(x0 > 5) ∨ T1) ∧ ((x0 > 5) ∨ T2) ∧ (¬(x0 > 5) ∨ (x1 = x0 + 1)) ∧
(¬(x1 < 3) ∨ T3) ∧ (¬(x1 < 3) ∨ (x2 = x1 − 1)) ∧
((x1 < 3) ∨ T4) ∧ ((x1 < 3) ∨ (y1 = x1 + 1))
(4.1)
ϕ is a Linear Arithmetic formula. Boolean variables, T1 . . . T4, are called Boolean
atoms, and atomic formulas, e.g. (x0 > 5), are called theory atoms or T -atoms. Any
first-order formula ϕ can be abstracted into a Boolean skeleton by replacing each
T -atom in ϕ with its Boolean abstraction. For the example above, we define new
Boolean variables G1, G2, A1, A2, A3 for the Boolean abstraction of T -atoms, and the
abstraction can be expressed as:
BA := G1 = (x0 > 5) ∧G2 = (x1 < 3) ∧
A1 = (x1 = x0 + 1) ∧ A2 = (x2 = x1 − 1) ∧ A3 = (y1 = x1 + 1)
(4.2)
1This claim is not for the decision procedure STP [62], which converts Bit Vector formulas into
propositional formulas and solves them with a SAT solver.
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As the result, we obtain a formula ϕP (P stands for propositional) as the Boolean
skeleton of ϕ. Obviously, ϕ is logically equivalent to ϕP ∧ BA.
ϕP := (¬G1 ∨ T1) ∧ (G1 ∨ T2) ∧ (¬G1 ∨ A1) ∧
(¬G2 ∨ T3) ∧ (¬G2 ∨ A2) ∧
(G2 ∨ T4) ∧ (G2 ∨ A3)
(4.3)
function DPLL(BooleanFormula ϕ){
µ = True; status = propagate(ϕ, µ);
if (status == Sat) return Sat;
else if (status ==UnSat) returnUnSat;
while (True) {
l = decide(ϕ);
µ = µ ∧ l;
status = propagate(ϕ, µ);
if (status == Sat) return Sat;
else if (status == UnSat)
if (allStatesAreExplored())
return UnSat;
else backtrack(ϕ, µ);
} }
Figure 4.1: DPLL algorithm
The DPLL(T ) algorithm is the integration of the DPLL algorithm with a T -solver.
The DPLL algorithm searches on ϕP , returning a conjunction of Boolean literal µP .
Replacing all the new Boolean atoms, Gi and Ai, in µ
P with their corresponding
T -atoms, we obtain the conjunction µ in T . The T -solver then checks whether µ is
consistent with the theory T . Below is the illustration of DPLL(T ) on ϕ (for the
limit of space, only decision literals are shown in µP ):
0. µP = True ϕP
1. µP = G1 ϕ
P = (¬G2 ∨ T3) ∧ (¬G2 ∨ A2) ∧ (G2 ∨ T4) ∧ (G2 ∨ A3)
2. µP = G1 ∧G2 ϕP = True ; T -solver(µ) = Inconsistent
3. µP = G1 ϕ
P = (¬G2 ∨ T3) ∧ (¬G2 ∨ A2) ∧ (G2 ∨ T4) ∧ (G2 ∨ A3)
4. µP = G1 ∧ ¬G2 ϕP = True ; T -solver(µ) = Consistent
The DPLL algorithm tries to build a model using three main operations: decide,
propagate, and backtrack [54]. The operation decide heuristically chooses a literal
l (which is an unassigned Boolean atom or its negation) for branching. The operation
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propagate then removes all the clauses containing l, and deletes all occurrences of ¬l
in the formula; this procedure is also called Boolean Constraint Propagation (BCP).
If after deleting a literal from a clause, the clause only has only one literal left (unit
clause), BCP assigns this literal to True. If deleting a literal from a clause results
in an empty clause, this is called a conflict. In this case, the DPLL procedure must
backtrack and try a different branch value.
At step 1, G1 is decided to be the branching literal, and the T -solver validates that
(x0 > 5) is consistent. BCP removes the clause (G1 ∨ T2), and deletes all occurrences
of ¬G1. This results in two unit clauses T1 and A1, so they are assigned to True, which
means µP = G1∧T1∧A1. Similarly, at step 2 G2 is chosen, i.e. µP = G1∧T1∧A1∧G2.
The T -solver checks the conjunction: µ = (x0 > 5) ∧ T1 ∧ (x1 < 3) ∧ (x1 = x0 + 1).
This is obviously inconsistent, thus DPLL(T ) backtracks and tries ¬G2, which leads
to a consistent model.
Note that DPLL(T ) refers to various procedures integrating DPLL and a T -solver.
There are DPLL(T ) procedures with integration schemas different from what we have
described here. The interested reader is pointed to [105] for further references.
4.3 Symbolic Execution as DPLL(T )
Intuitively, a program can be encoded into a (first-order) formula whose models cor-
respond to program traces. Symbolic Executors explore all program traces w.r.t. the
set of program conditions, therefore they can be viewed as SMT solvers that return
all (partial) models w.r.t. a set of Boolean atoms.
In this thesis we only consider bounded programs, since this is the class of programs
that SE can analyse. This means every loop can be unwound into a sequence if
statements. In order to encode a program into a formula, all program variables
are renamed in the manner of Static Single Assignment form [49]: each variable is
assigned exactly once, and it is renamed into a new variable when being reassigned.
In this way, assignments such as x = x + 1 will not be encoded into an unsatisfiable
atomic formula. Under these settings, a program P can be modelled by a Symbolic
Transition System (STS) as follows:
P ≡ (S, I,G,A, T )
57
S is the set of program states, I ⊆ S is the set of initial states; each state in the STS
models the computer memory at a program point. G is the set of guards and A is
the set of actions; guards and actions are first-order formulas.
An action models the effect of an instruction on the computer memory. Actions
that do not update the computer memory (e.g. conditional jumps) are Boolean
atoms, the others are T -atoms. T ⊆ S × G × A × S is the transition function,
tij = 〈si, gij, aij, sj〉 ∈ T models a transition from state si to state sj by taking action
aij under the guard gij. After a transition tij : si → sj, the state sj is exactly as the
state si apart from the variable updated by the action aij.
Note that this STS models the program in more detail than the transition system in
section 2.3 that will be used in other chapters.
One way to encode a transition tij into a first-order formula is to present it in the form:
tij ≡ gij → aij, or equally tij ≡ ¬gij ∨ aij. This encoding expresses that satisfying
the guard gij implies that the action aij is performed. In this way, a program trace
is defined as a sequence of transitions:
t01 ∧ t12 ∧ · · · ∧ t(k−1)k = (¬g01 ∨ a01) ∧ (¬g12 ∨ a12) · · · ∧ (¬g(k−1)k ∨ a(k−1)k)
The semantics of the program is then defined as the set of all possible traces, or
equally the set of all possible transitions, which can be represented as the following
formula:
ϕ =
∧
tij∈T
tij =
∧
tij∈T
(¬gij ∨ aij) (4.4)
void test(int x, int y){
if(x > 5){
x++;
if (x < 3)
x--;
else
y = x + 1;
}
}
 
 
  
 
 
  
s0
s1 s2
s3
s4 s5
s6 s7
x0 > 5
T1
¬(x0 > 5)
T2
x0 > 5
x1 = x0 + 1
x1 < 3
T3
¬(x1 < 3)
T4
x1 < 3 ¬(x1 < 3)
y1 = x1 + 1x2 = x1 − 1
Figure 4.2: A simple program and its associated STS. “if(x > 5)” is modelled by two
transitions 〈s0, (x0 > 5), T1, s1〉 and 〈s0,¬(x0 > 5), T2, s2〉; then “x++” is modelled by
〈s1, (x0 > 5), x1 = x0 + 1, s3〉; similarly for the rest of the program.
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Figure 4.2 depicts a simple example program and its associated STS. Encoding this
STS following (4.4) results in the formula (4.1) that we have illustrated with DPLL(T )
in the previous section. We now illustrate this example with SE.
Similar to an SMT solver, a Symbolic Executor at a high level can be viewed as the
integration of two components: a Boolean Executor (BE) to execute the instructions
and a T -solver to check the feasibility of path conditions. For example, SPF has a
parameter symbolic.dp to customize which decision procedure to use. If we set this
parameter with the option no_solver then SPF solely works on the BE.
function Executor(Program P ){
PathCondition pc = True;
InstructionPointer i = Null;
update(P, i);
if (i == Return) return;
while (True) {
l = decide(i);
pc = pc ∧ l;
update(P, i);
if (i == Return)
if (allStatesAreExplored())
return;
else backtrack(pc, i);
} }
Figure 4.3: A simplified Boolean Executor
Figure 4.3 depicts a simplified procedure of a BE. This procedure can be described as
trying to build all path conditions using three main operations: decide, update and
backtrack. The operation decide chooses a literal l, a condition (or its negation) of
an if statement, for branching, adding it to the path condition. The operation update
then symbolically executes a block of statement, i.e. no branching statement presents,
updating the computer memory. When the BE reaches the end of a symbolic path,
it backtracks to explore other paths. A Symbolic Executor, which is the integration
of a BE and a T -solver, backtracks if the path condition is not satisfied.
Both DPLL and BE rely on Depth-First Search, they are similar in the way they
decide and backtrack2. After choosing a literal, e.g. (x0 > 5), BE executes the
block it guards, i.e. T1 and x1 = x0 + 1. This is exactly the same as in DPLL: after
choosing gij, for all the clauses (¬gij ∨ aij), BCP deletes ¬gij, assigning aij to True.
2We consider DPLL in its simplest form, without non-chronological backtracking.
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Therefore, the operation update does the same work as BCP, we can view a BE as
implementing the DPLL algorithm, and SE as DPLL(T ).
4.4 SQIF by Symbolic Execution:
With the view of SE as #DPLL(T ), we are able to make a Symbolic Executor work
as SymbolicQIF with little effort. The key idea here is to enumerate all concrete
values from symbolic executions.
s1
s2 s3
p1 p1
p2 p2
H ≥ 16
pc := (H 16)
H < 16
pc := (H ≥ 16)<
pc ∧ p1 pc ∧ p1
pc ∧ p1 ∧ p2pc ∧ p1 ∧ ¬p2
Figure 4.4: Partial exploration path of SQIF-SE for the data sanitization program
from Figure 3.1.
For a program P that takes symbolic inputs i1, i2, ..iα, and produces an output O,
the result of running SE on P is as follows:
O =

f1(i1, i2.., iα) if pc1
f2(i1, i2.., iα) if pc2
. . . . . .
fβ(i1, i2.., iα) if pcβ

where f1, f2, ..fβ are formulas over symbolic inputs i1, i2, ..iα. pc1, pc2, ..pcβ are the
path conditions. Notice fi expresses a symbolic final value for O, i.e. in terms of SymEx
instead of fi(i1, i2.., iα) we could write σi(O) for σi ∈ Σ. The following proposition
was proved by King [74]:
Proposition 1
∀i, j ∈ [1, β] ∧ i 6= j, pci ∧ pcj = ⊥
which means that path conditions are mutually exclusive.
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Definition 21 For a path condition pci obtained from SE, the concretization set of
pci, denoted CS(pci), is the set of all concrete values of output O that can be reached
by executing the program following pci.
Consider again the illustrative example in Figure 3.1, in which there are two path
conditions: pc1 = H < 16 and pc2 = H ≥ 16. The corresponding concretization sets
of these path conditions are: CS(pc1) = [8..23] and CS(pc2) = [24..232]. The set of all
possible values of output O is formed by the union of concretization sets of all paths,
and thus:
N =
∣∣∣∣∣
β⋃
i=1
CS(pci)
∣∣∣∣∣
The set CS(pci) can be computed by inserting the code in Figure 3.4 at the end of
the program and run SE: we add M conditions, each one tests whether bit bi of the
output O is 0 or 1. TheseM conditions test all the bits of the output O. Exploring all
possible combinations of these conditions leads to enumerating all possible values of O.
We denote by SQIF-SE the implementation of SQIF using SE. A partial exploration
path of SQIF-SE is described as in Figure 4.4. SE as implemented by Symbolic
PathFinder (SPF) returns a concrete values for each possible path. The number of
distinct concrete values is the N that we need to count.
SQIF-SE is implemented into a prototyping tool jpf-qif built on top of SPF. The
tool works on Java programs.
4.5 Soundness and Completeness
SQIF-SE relies on a Symbolic Executor, and hence it is complete in programs with
a bounded model of runtime behaviour, which means programs have no recursion or
unbounded loops. These are well-known issues in SE and handling them is orthogonal
to our work. SQIF-SE is also sound given a sound Symbolic Executor.
4.6 Evaluation
To evaluate jpf-qif, we compare it against our previous implementation sqifc and the
selfcomp technique. For case studies, we revisit the data sanitization program and
the CRC programs in the previous chapter. Moreover, we consider the Tax program
as follows.
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4.6.1 Tax Record
Balliu et al. [19] provided a very interesting case study of information flow security in
Java programs derived from the EU-funded FP7-project HATS. The program contains
8 classes/interfaces and 267 LoC. In our analysis we assume the year 2011-2012 basic
tax rate in UK, which is applied for a person whose income does not exceed 35
thousand pounds per annum, is F = 20%3. Thus, the tax is less than 7 thousands
pound per annual. We assume that donations to charities is below the amount of tax
to be paid. Obviously, one cannot pay more than what one earns. Following [19] we
are interested in leaks of a taxpayer’s income and donations to a Tax checker.
QIF vs. Declassification
Balliu et al. considered two cases of declassification: the first one, called taxChecker1,
is associated with the policy “income× F% + donation > payment”, and the second
one, called taxChecker2, is associated with the policy “income × F% + donation −
payment”. They claimed that: “The value declassified in the taxChecker1 case, resp.
taxChecker2 case, is a lower bound, resp. upper bound, of the value revealed to the
tax checker in the fixed tax rate variant.”
We notice in this sentence the use of terms like “value revealed” and “bound”: the
authors were trying to describe quantitative concepts. From the result of jpf-qif, we
can give hence quantitative answers to these questions. In the case of taxChecker1,
the observable is whether the payment is greater or smaller than the sum of the tax
and donations, which means there are 2 possible outputs. This corresponds to the
leak of 1 bit. In other words, the user policy or threshold k = 1. Regarding the
taxChecker2 case, under the assumptions listed above, the leakage is upper bounded
by 4.86 bits obtained in 24.988 seconds.
Case Study LoC sqifc time jpf-qif time selfcomp time
Data Sanitization < 10 11.898 20.695 timed out
CRC (8) < 30 1.209 8.386 0.498
CRC (32) 8.657 9.357 timed out
Tax Record 267 - 24.988 -
Figure 4.5: Times in seconds, timeout is 30 minutes. “-” means inapplicable.
3Since SPF can only handle conditions with integer values, we simplify the code by replacing
(income× 20)/100 with tax as an integer. The simplification we made does not change the secrecy,
i.e. entropy, of income, so it will not affect the result of our analysis.
62
Results of the analysis are shown in Figure 4.5. In general, jpf-qif is slower than
sqifc, although they are different implementation of the same algorithm. It is not
surprising, as Java is always considered to be slower than C. Moreover, SPF is a
virtual machine running on top of the Java Virtual Machine. Hence, there are more
overheads in the implementation using SPF.
4.7 Discussion of related work
The correspondence between Symbolic Execution and the DPLL(T ) algorithm was
first briefly mentioned in our previous work [98]. In that paper, we described a
preliminary version of the DPLL-based algorithm in the previous chapter (Figure 3.6).
However, at that time the tool sqifc is not yet available. Instead, we presented a quick
implementation of the algorithm with SPF.
A year later, Brain et al. [29] published an excellent paper showing the correspondence
between DPLL(T ) and Abstract Interpretation. Although it is believed that Symbolic
Execution is a case of Abstract Interpretation4, we are not aware of any paper to
discuss rigorously this relation.
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolic_execution
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Chapter 5
Concurrent Bounded Model
Checking
In the chapters 3 and 4, we have introduced two implementations of the Symbolic
Quantitative Information Flow approach: the first one is sqifc, which employs the
Bounded Model Checker CBMC; and the second one is jpf-qif, built on top of the
Symbolic PathFinder symbolic execution platform. A natural research question would
be whether there is a relation between the two symbolic techniques: Bounded Model
Checking and Symbolic Execution.
This chapter studies this relation and introduces a methodology, based on Symbolic
Execution, for Concurrent Bounded Model Checking. In our approach, we translate
a program into a formula in a disjunctive form, and this design enables concurrent
verification: a main thread running a symbolic executor, without constraint solving,
to build sub-formulas, and a set of worker threads running a decision procedure for
satisfiability checks.
We have implemented this methodology in a tool called JCBMC, the first bounded
model checker for Java. JCBMC is built as an extension of Java PathFinder, an open-
source verification platform developed by NASA. JCBMC uses Symbolic PathFinder
(SPF) for the symbolic execution, Z3 as the solver and implements concurrency with
multi-threading.
For evaluation, we compare JCBMC against SPF and CBMC. The results of the
experiments show that we can achieve significant advantages of performance over
these two state-of-the-art tools.
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5.1 Introduction
Model checking techniques are often classified in two categories: explicit-state or
symbolic, depending on how they process the states of the system. While explicit-
state model checking enumerates all possible states of the system explicitly, possibly
on-the-fly [4, 10], symbolic model checking represents sets of states symbolically, and
hence more efficiently, by using Binary Decision Diagrams [84] or Boolean formulae
[26]. SAT or SMT-based Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [26] unwinds the transition
relation of a program for a fixed number of steps k and checks whether a property
violation can occur in k or fewer steps. This bounded verification is reduced to a
satisfiability check performed by a SAT or SMT solver. BMC is widely used in the
hardware industry.
For software, the application of BMC for ANSI-C is embodied in CBMC [45, 44],
which has been successfully used for many practical applications. In CBMC a C pro-
gram containing assertions is translated into a formula (in Static Single Assignment
form) which is then fed to a SAT or SMT solver to check its satisfiability. A satisfying
assignment indicates that an error was found.
Bounded model checking has not been explored so far for many other languages,
including Java. However, explicit-state model checking tools such as Java PathFinder
(JPF) [4] have been successfully used for the verification of many Java applications.
Furthermore, there has been an explosion of symbolic execution [74] tools that have
been used successfully for test case generation and error detection in the context of
many high level languages, for example [63, 64, 106, 32]. In particular, relevant for the
work reported here, Symbolic PathFinder (SPF) [100] is a symbolic execution tool
built as an extension of JPF, that provides a symbolic analysis for Java programs
involving multi-threading and complex data structures.
In this thesis, we describe an alternative methodology for BMC which is based on
“classical” symbolic execution (SE) in the sense of King [74]. Note that the way
CBMC transforms a program into Static Single Assignment form can also be viewed
as executing the program symbolically. However, this encoding is different from the
SE of King and we evaluate the two encodings as part of the work reported here. Our
methodology is not language specific and only relies on a symbolic executor for that
language and an SMT solver.
65
By using symbolic execution we obtain a translation of a program and assertions
into a disjunctive formula encoding the path conditions for each bounded (complete)
path explored in the code. This suggests a simple concurrent verification strategy that
relies on the observations that any subset of disjuncts in a disjunction F = F1∨· · ·∨Fn
can be separately checked for satisfiability and whenever a subset is found to be
satisfiable the satisfiability task can be stopped. Hence the verification of disjunctive
formulas is naturally parallelizable.
We have implemented this methodology in a tool called JCBMC, which stands for
Java Concurrent BoundedModel Checker. The tool is built on top of SPF, and uses
it to generate the disjunctive formula from the code (constraint solving is turned off in
SPF itself) and while generating the formula it sends sub-formulas to multiple worker
threads for satisfiability checking. JCBMC handles programs with multi-threading
and recursive input data structures and relies on a standard SMT solver, namely
Z3 [13] for solving the constraints. Other solvers can easily be incorporated. One can
even use different solvers for solving different path constraints in parallel.
Although JCBMC is only a prototype, and concurrency is implemented by multi-
threading but not parallelized yet, its performance, compared with existing tools, i.e.
Symbolic PathFinder and CBMC, is remarkable. We summarize our contributions as
follows:
• A methodology for concurrent bounded model checking that is based on “clas-
sical” symbolic execution and it is naturally parallelizable.
• The methodology is language independent and supports assume-guarantee rea-
soning.
• A tool JCBMC, a concurrent bounded model checker for Java.
• Experiments to show effectiveness of the tool for verification of programs with
multi-threading and data structures.
• Comparisons with bounded model checking and “classical” symbolic execution,
as embodied by CBMC and SPF respectively.
5.2 Illustrative example
We illustrate our approach using the simple example program in Figure 5.1. We want
to check if the assertion in line 9 is valid for all possible inputs. Note that an analysis
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using an explicit state model checker such as JPF would not be feasible, as this would
involve enumerating all the possible inputs to the program.
1 void test(int x, int y){
2 if(x > 5){
3 x++;
4 if (x < 3)
5 x--;
6 else
7 y = x;
8 }
9 assert (x < 10 );
10 }
Figure 5.1: A simple example
1. pc = >; σ = {x 7→ x0, y 7→ y0}
2. pc = (x0 > 5); σ = {x 7→ x0, y 7→ y0}
3. pc = (x0 > 5); σ = {x 7→ x0 + 1, y 7→ y0}
4. pc = (x0 > 5); σ = {x 7→ x0 + 1, y 7→ y0}
6. pc = (x0 > 5); σ = {x 7→ x0 + 1, y 7→ y0}
7. pc = (x0 > 5); σ = {x 7→ x0 + 1, y 7→ x0 + 1}
Figure 5.2: SE for the path: (1,2,3,4,6,7)
Figure 5.2 illustrates a part of classical SE with constraints solving on the program
following the path (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7). This analysis could be performed using e.g. SPF.
Instead of concrete values, SE takes the symbols x0 and y0 as inputs and executes
them just like concrete values. It also keeps track of the path condition pc which
consists of the conditions true along that path and the symbolic environment σ which
maps variables into expressions over the input symbols x0, y0. Typically, whenever
the pc is updated, SE checks the satisfiability of pc using an off-the-shelf solver.
Initially, pc is true, and σ maps inputs to theirs symbols. When SE reaches line 2,
it updates pc as (x0 > 5) since this is the condition to reach line 3 where σ becomes
x 7→ x0 + 1. In line 4, the condition (x < 3) is translated in σ to c ≡ (x0 + 1 < 3).
At this point SE calls an SMT solver, and detects that pc ` ¬c because (x0 > 5) `
¬(x0 + 1 < 3), therefore it jumps to line 6 with pc unchanged.
In our approach for BMC, SE plays the role of generating the formula which encodes
the program behaviour and the property to be checked. The satisfiability of the
resulting formula will be checked separately by an SMT solver. Therefore, we execute
SE without invoking constraint solving whenever pc is updated, and we postpone
checking the pc until the end of the execution path. In this way, we can save the
execution time of calling the solver, but the trade-off is that infeasible paths are also
included. However, this will not affect the soundness of the analysis, since constraint
solving is performed later. When SE reaches line 9 following the path {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7},
we have:
pc = (x0 > 5) ∧ ¬(x0 + 1 < 3)
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Here we reach the property P to verify, which is (x < 10). We denote by P|σ the
evaluation of P in the symbolic environment σ. At this point, σ maps x to x0 + 1,
which leads to the following:
P|σ = (x0 + 1 < 10)
The property P is violated in this path if we can find a model for
pc ∧ ¬P|σ = (x0 > 5) ∧ ¬(x0 + 1 < 3) ∧ ¬(x0 + 1 < 10)
Setting x0 = 11 will provide such a model. The whole formula generated by our
approach for the code in Figure 5.1 is:
((x0 > 5) ∧ ¬(x0 + 1 < 3) ∧ ¬(x0 + 1 < 10)) ∨
((x0 > 5) ∧ (x0 + 1 < 3) ∧ ¬(x0 < 10)) ∨
(¬(x0 > 5) ∧ ¬(x0 < 10))
In general, we use SE to explore all possible symbolic paths up to a certain length,
and then encode the program together with the property to check into a formula of
the form:
M∨
i=0
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi)
where N is the number of paths that may trigger the error. This form allows us to
divide the formula into blocks of D disjunctions:
D−1∨
i=0
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi) ∨
2D−1∨
i=D
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi) · · · ∨
kD−1∨
i=(k−1)D
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi) ∨
M∨
i=kD
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi)
In this way, we can solve the formula concurrently using several threads, each one
solving a single block. A model of a single block is also a model of the formula,
therefore the procedure stops when any of the threads find out a model. In JCBMC,
after the main thread generates a sub-formula and passes it to a worker thread, it
moves on to generate the next sub-formula, while the worker thread solves the given
sub-formula concurrently.
5.3 Concurrent Bounded Model Checking
Our method for concurrent bounded model checking is illustrated in Figure 5.3. The
inputs to the method are: a program under test, a property to verify and three
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parameters – B is the search bound, N is the number of workers and D is the number
of disjuncts to give to one worker. The goal is to check if the property holds in the
program, up to exploration bound B.
Solver 
Worker thread 
Main thread 
Solver 
Worker thread 
Solver 
Worker thread 
Controller 
Stop 
Symbolic Execution 
(constraint solving off) 
A disjunction of D 
path conditions Program 
B, D, N 
Figure 5.3: Concurrent Bounded Model Checking architecture
5.3.1 Bounded Model Checking by Symbolic Execution
The program under test is analysed using “classical” bounded symbolic execution with
constraint solving turned off. This means that whenever a path condition is updated,
we do not check its satisfiability, but rather continue the exploration. As a result,
symbolic execution may explore infeasible paths, which will be checked later using
constraint solving. Our approach can be used for the bounded verification of safety
properties, which we assume have been reduced to checking assertions embedded in
the code. Furthermore, our method supports both assume and assert statements to
enable assume-guarantee style verification. The assumed conditions are simply added
to the path conditions during the symbolic execution.
The result of SE is a disjunction of path conditions, encoding constraints on the
inputs to follow those paths, up to the pre-specified search bound. From among these
paths, only the ones that may lead to assert violations are selected for solving. This
is achieved by the controller which collects sets of D violating path conditions and
sends them for solving to parallel worker threads, using off-the-shelf solvers. The
workers start solving as soon as they receive the disjunctive formulas, which may
happen while the symbolic execution is still exploring the program. The verification
terminates as soon as one of the threads finds a satisfying assignment, in which case an
error is reported, or when all the disjunctions are found to be un-satisfiable, in which
case the assertion holds (no error) up to the given bound. Note that if the symbolic
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execution discovers no potentially violating paths (i.e. the error is unreachable), then
no solving will be performed.
5.3.2 Comparing our approach with BMC and SE
Compared with classical BMC we use an explicit enumeration of paths, while BMC
uses an implicit enumeration of paths. Although at first glance the implicit encoding
should be better our experiments, even with sequential JCBMC, show that this is not
the case. Furthermore, the explicit enumeration is easily parallelizable, with simple
and natural load balancing for different threads. Crucially our approach stops as soon
as a path leading to an error is found to be satisfiable, while with classical BMC, all
the program needs to be explored.
Compared with classical symbolic execution: we solve only in the end. So obviously
the price to be paid is the exploration of infeasible paths. On the other hand, again,
it is naturally parallelizable and constraint solving, which is one of the bottlenecks
in SE, can be done in parallel, even with different solvers, with little coordination, if
any, needed.
In the following we describe in more detail our method. We start with a description of
a sequential approach, to clarify how we use symbolic execution to built a disjunctive
formula of the path conditions. Solving this formula happens after the symbolic
execution, sequentially.
5.3.3 Sequential Verification
Our approach of employing SE for BMC is based on a simple observation. Suppose
sk is an error state in the transition system P . To determine the reachability of sk
from the initial state s0, BMC builds a series of transitions s0 → s1 → .. → sk,
resulting in the formula in (2.4) of Section 2.4.1. On the other hand, SE builds the
path condition pc which is a first order formula also characterising reachability of sk
from s0. Therefore, both condition (2.4) and pc characterize all the inputs that reach
the error.
Suppose we want to prove formally that the program P satisfies, within given bounds,
a property P represented by a set of assertions. This means whenever the program
reaches an assertion point, the assertion needs to be valid, which means:
∧
(pci →
P|σi). This can be verified by checking the satisfiability of
∨
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi).
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1: function SymExBMC(σ, pc, l, i)
2: if (i > B)
3: return
4: Extract statement s at l
5: while (s is not an if -statement ∧ l 6= EOF )
6: if (isSAT = >)
7: return
8: if (s is ‘assume c’)
9: pc← pc ∧ c|σ
10: else if (s is ‘assert c’)
11: Process(pc ∧ ¬c|σ)
12: else
13: Execute the assignment s, update σ
14: l← next(l)
15: Extract statement s at l
16: if (l = EOF )
17: return
18: Extract {c, l>, l⊥} from if -statement
19: i← i+ 1
20: pc1 ← pc ∧ c|σ
21: SymExBMC(σ, pc1, l>, i)
22: pc2 ← pc ∧ ¬c|σ
23: SymExBMC(σ, pc2, l⊥, i)
Figure 5.4: Formula generation for BMC
function Process(γ)
Γ← Γ ∨ γ
Figure 5.5: Process error
paths
Proof 1 First notice one formula is the negation of the other one, i.e.∧
(pci → P|σi) =
∧
(¬pci ∨ P|σi) =
∧
¬(pci ∧ ¬P|σi) = ¬
∨
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi)
hence if
∨
(pci∧¬P|σi) is satisfiable there exists an i such that pci∧¬P|σi is satisfiable
i.e. an initial state leading to the path pci and not satisfying the property P|σi. On the
other hand if
∨
(pci∧¬P|σi) if not satisfiable then no disjunct pci∧¬P|σi is satisfiable
hence there exists no initial state leading to an execution path satisfying the assertion.
The algorithm in Figure 5.4 shows how to build the formula Γ =
∨
(pci ∧ ¬P|σi) for
the GC language described in the previous section. In essence, the algorithm runs
classical SE with no constraint solving for checking pc satisfiability. A statement of
GC is determined by its location l, and the function next(l) returns the location of
the next statement. An if-statement consists of a condition c, the location l> if c is
true, and the location l⊥ if c is false. In the recursive procedure SymExBMC as well as
the function Process, all parameters are passed by value. In SymExBMC, the checking
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from line 6 to line 7 is only used in concurrent mode. In sequential mode, isSAT is
set to false, and it is not changed in the whole procedure. Γ is declared as a global
variable, initialised to false (denoted by ⊥). k is global constant, defining the bound
of BMC.
Similar to standard SE, at the beginning the symbolic environment σ maps program
inputs to symbols, the path condition pc is initialised to true (denoted by >). The
depth i of the recursion is initialised to 0. The procedure SymExBMC starts by ensuring
the search depth i not to reach the bound B (line 2 to line 3). As from line 4 to line
15, it symbolically executes a basic block, i.e. without branching statement, of the
program. The basic block ends by an if-statement or when the location l reaches
the end of the source file (l = EOF ). Assumptions and assertions are evaluated by
the current symbolic environment (line 9, 11). When there is an assignment, the
symbolic environment updates the mapping for the variable in the left hand side
by the evaluation of the right hand side. At the end of the block, if there is an
if-statement at the next location, SymExBMC is recursively called for both the then
path and the else path. The condition is added to the path conditions without any
checking of path feasibility.
5.3.4 Concurrent Verification
The simple algorithm presented in the previous sections will essentially enumerate all
the possible feasible and infeasible paths through a program (up to a given bound),
collect the path conditions for each path into a formula in disjunctive form and then
invoke a constraint solver to check the satisfiability, all at once. The disadvantage of
the approach is that it needs to enumerate all the possible paths through the program,
which can quickly become expensive, especially if multi-threading is also considered.
We therefore propose a concurrent algorithm that parallelises SymExBMC by delegating
the satisfiability check of the disjuncts in Γ to worker threads. The concurrency of the
algorithm relies on two parameters: the number of concurrent workers available and
the number of disjuncts sent to each worker: the optimal choice is architecture and
SMT solver dependent. In our experiments we found 200 disjuncts to be a reasonable
choice.
The main function is in Figure 5.6. It initialises Γ, pc, σ exactly the same as in
sequential mode of SymExBMC. Here, isSAT is a boolean variable shared between the
threads, and can be modified (set to true) by them. d is also a global variable of
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Γ, isSAT ← ⊥; pc← >; d, i← 0
l← first statement
SymExBMC(σ, pc, l, i)
if (i > 0 ∧ isSAT = ⊥)
Execute Run(Γ, isSAT ) in worker thread
if (isSAT = ⊥)
Return Verification successful
else
Return Verification failed
Figure 5.6: Main thread
function Run(Γ, isSAT )
Run SMT-Solver on Γ
if (Γ has a model)
isSAT = >
Figure 5.7: Worker thread
function Process(γ)
Γ← Γ ∨ γ
d← d+ 1
if (d ≥ D)
Execute Run(Γ, isSAT ) in worker thread
Γ← ⊥; d← 0
Figure 5.8: Process error paths for Concurrent BMC
the main thread only to keep the number of current disjuncts. After initializing, the
function SymExBMC is called. The main difference between sequential and concurrent
mode is the function Process in Figure 5.8 and the checking from line 6 to line 7
in SymExBMC. In sequential mode, isSAT is always false, so SymExBMC keeps building
the formula until it reaches EOF. In concurrent mode, when the number of disjuncts
in Γ reaches a bound B, Process sends Γ for satisfiability check to a worker thread.
Crucially this worker thread can run in parallel to any other running thread as they
run completely independent tasks.
Whenever a worker thread finds a model for its own Γ it sets the shared variable
isSAT to true which will return control to the main thread and end the computation
with Verification failed. If no thread sets isSAT to true then SymExBMC will
eventually terminate and the remaining disjuncts (whose number is hence less than
D) are sent for satisfiability check to a final thread. Verification successful is
returned only if no thread has set isSAT to true during the computation.
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Implementation
Our prototype tool, JCBMC, has been implemented following the Observer Design
Pattern [61]. SPF executes symbolically the Java bytecode program and acts as the
subject. The Controller acts as the observer, it waits for SPF to have generated a
sub-formula Γ withD disjuncts and then sends it to an available worker thread. D is a
user chosen parameter of JCBMC. The worker thread executes Run(Γ, isSAT ) which
first writes Γ into a file in SMT2 format [21], then calls the SMT solver Z3 to check
for satisfiability. JCBMC creates a thread pool of N workers; current architecture
doesn’t support parallelism but only multi-threading.
JCBMC is built on top of SPF and as an extension of the JPF platform, therefore it
inherits all the power of JPF and SPF.
5.4 Evaluation
Our evaluation comprises cases studies to compare JCBMC with SPF (with default
configuration) and case studies to compare JCBMC with CBMC1. To compare with
CBMC we have considered C code whose Java translation is almost literal.
An important reminder is that the current implementation of JCBMC is multi-
threaded but not yet parallel and we expect a parallel implementation to have a
significant advantage over the current one.
By JSBMC we denote the sequential implementation of JCBMC where a single thread
is used. Experiments are run on a machine equipped with dual Xeon(R) E5-2670
CPUs. The results are shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. Unless otherwise specified
times are in seconds, xmy means x minutes and y seconds, “timed out” is one hour
and x denotes a memory hit2. The source code for the examples can be found at:
https://github.com/qsphan/jpf-bmc.
1To compare both tools with the same solver in the experiments CBMC will be called with option
–smt2, and we will use Z3 for satisfiability checks.
2A memory hit is a “run out of memory” problem. This can be addressed by a different memory
manager in JPF or with a direct implementation of SymExBMC.
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SPF JSBMC CBMC JCBMC (10) JCBMC (200)
Array size Bubble sort with assertion negated
5 4.517 2.174 0.460 1.097 1.338
6 5.622 12.604 0.817 1.160 1.389
15 36.194 x 56m34.033 1.195 1.948
30 4m32.790 x timed out 1.387 2.905
100 timed out x timed out 4.944 34.697
Verification of bubble sort
5 6m19.222 3.712 7.171 4.193 3.622
6 timed out 26.293 37.816 29.512 21.834
7 x x 5m22.641 x x
8 x x timed out x x
Sum of array
unsafe 1.403 12.671 1m5.738 1.576 2.479
safe failed 12.030 2.252 9.466 10.614
Figure 5.9: Performance of all tools. JCBMC(10) and JCBMC(200) mean JCBMC
is run with the parameter D as 10 and 200 respectively. “failed” refers to SPF failing
to solve the constraints using the integrated solver.
5.4.1 Comparing with CBMC and SPF
Bubble Sort
We consider the classical bubble sort algorithm, which has already been studied in the
BMC community [2, 15]. Here, differently from [15], we consider the more challenging
symbolic version where the values of the array are non-deterministically chosen. We
consider both the verification of the assertion “the elements of the array are ordered
after bubble sort” and its negation “the elements of the array are not ordered after
bubble sort”. We analyse a program implementing bubble sort. It will hence contain
no bugs for the positive assertion and will be buggy for the negation. Results are
shown in Fig 5.9. We notice that while CBMC is better for the positive assertion,
JCBMC outperforms the other tools for the negative assertion and is capable of find
a counterexample for array sizes of a higher order of magnitude.
Sum of array
We consider the array case studies taken from [2], in particular sum_array_safe.c
for verification and sum_array_unsafe.c for refutation. The array size is set to 1000.
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Results show both SPF and JCBMC outperform CBMC for the unsafe version, while
CBMC has a slight advantage for the safe version.
5.4.2 Comparing with SPF (Java code)
The following examples consist of substantial Java code which is not naturally trans-
latable in C; we hence compare JCBMC only with SPF. Notice JCBMC and SPF
are both extensions of JPF: in the case all inputs are concrete they both reduce to
JPF-core hence their performance is identical. Hence we only consider programs with
symbolic inputs.
Flap controller
This case study is shipped with the distribution of SPF. It is a multi-threaded program
modelling a simplified flap controller on an aircraft. It contains 3 classes, and 80 lines
of code. This example demonstrates handling of multi-threading.
Red Black Tree
This is another example from the SPF distributions (3474 LOC in one class). We
check for consistency of the tree after performing put, remove, get and firstKey
symbolically. Results show that both JSBMC and JCBMC significantly outperform
SPF.
MER Arbiter
The MER Arbiter models a component of the flight software for NASA JPL’s Mars
Exploration Rovers (MER). The MER Arbiter has been modelled in Simulink/State-
flow and it was automatically translated into Java using the Polyglot framework and
analyzed with SPF [17]. The configuration for our analysis involved two users and five
resources. The example has 268 classes, 553 methods, 4697 lines of code (including
the Java Polyglot execution framework) but only approx. 50 classes are relevant. We
analyse the code with and without the error (see [17]). The performances of SPF,
JSBMC and JCBMC are comparable, with SPF slightly better.
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Tool SPF JSBMC JCBMC (10) JCBMC (200)
Flap controller (unsafe) 1.141 2.899 0.948 1.370
Red-black tree (safe) 53.602 3.942 3.267 2.774
MER Arbiter (unsafe) 5.275 8.111 7.479 7.579
MER Arbiter (safe) 47.065 59.145 57.740 58.886
Figure 5.10: Performance on Flap controller, Red-black tree and MER Arbiter.
JCBMC(10) and JCBMC(200) mean JCBMC is run with the parameter D as 10
and 200 respectively.
Discussion of experiments
Comparing with CBMC, JCBMC scores better in finding counterexamples than in
verifying their absence; this is consistent with its design because a counterexample
corresponds to a worker thread finding a model of the formula. Compared with
SPF, JCBMC can be much better (see bubble sort or red black tree) but can also
be comparable or slightly worse (see MER Arbiter and Flap Controller results). The
reason for the latter is that the cost of generating path conditions dominates the cost
of solving them. Similarly, SPF failed to generate formulas for bubble sort for sizes
7 and higher. Furthermore, an error path (e.g. in MER) may occur at the beginning
of the SE exploration, and it is therefore discovered quickly by SPF, while JCBMC
still needs to generate the pre-specified number D of error paths before solving them.
The results suggest one direction for future work, namely to investigate improving
the cost of SE-based path generation (see last section).
5.5 Discussion of related work
Related approaches on parallelising BMC [14, 115] address parallel solving of the
conjunctive formula that is built for BMC and aim at performing solving at different
bounds, where some clauses are shared to enable more efficient SAT solving. In
contrast we aim to solve the formulas generated with SE for the same bound, which are
naturally disjoint resulting in a simpler parallel algorithm. Furthermore our work aims
at verifying programs written in high-level languages such as Java and it is not clear
how the previous work, performed in the context of finite state automata, would be
applicable. Also related is the work on parallel SAT and SMT solving [109, 104, 116],
which can be seen complementing the work presented here, in the sense that we can
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use e.g. the parallel version of Z3 [116] in each of the workers to further speed up our
proposed approach.
PKIND [71] is a parallel model checker for Lustre that uses k-induction. PKIND
runs in parallel the different tasks involved in performing the induction, e.g. the
base step, the induction step and also the generation of auxiliary invariants used
for verification. Therefore PKIND performs the parallel work at a higher level of
granularity than JCBMC. It would be interesting to investigate if we can replace
the parallel tasks in PKIND with our own version of SE-based bounded verification,
which in turn is parallelized at the level of granularity of symbolic paths.
Parallel model checking has been investigated in the context of explicit-state [20, 91,
31, 68, 112, 70] and symbolic [88, 78] exploration. The latter were done in the context
of verification using Binary Decision Diagrams, and hence are very different from
ours. These approaches concentrate on partitioning the state space to be explored in
parallel and on dealing with the communication overhead between parallel workers.
In contrast, in our approach the workers perform the solving independently, with no
communication between them.
In previous work we have developed a framework for performing parallel symbolic
execution in SPF [111]. We used a set of pre-conditions to partition the symbolic
execution tree to distribute its processing. These pre-conditions were computed a
priori, using a “shallow” symbolic execution up to a small exploration bound, to
statically compute the different partitions of the input space with no communication
overhead. Other approaches to parallel symbolic execution [73, 39, 108] operate pri-
marily by dynamically partitioning the symbolic execution tree for load balancing,
which may result in better use of computational resources but also in more communi-
cation overhead. All these approaches were done in the context of “classical" [111, 73]
or dynamic [39, 108] symbolic execution, using constraint solving during path gen-
eration. In contrast the approach we advocate here has a clear separation between
path generation and constraint solving, allowing us to easily achieve load balancing
between workers, with little communication overhead. It would be interesting to com-
pare experimentally and to also combine the techniques in JCBMC and the parallel
version of SPF and we plan to do that in future work.
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Chapter 6
Quantifying Information Leaks
using Reliability Analysis
In chapter 4, we have presented the first technique to use Symbolic Execution for
Quantitative Information Flow analysis. There, Symbolic Execution has been used for
both exploring the program and counting the models. In this chapter, we explore an
alternative approach which uses Symbolic Execution only for exploring the program,
leaving the task of counting models for a reliability analysis tool.
This chapter can be divided in two parts. The first part studies the qualitative aspect
of information flow analysis. Its contribution is a novel and practical approach for
self-composition using Symbolic Execution.
In the second part of the chapter, we show the relation between reliability analysis
and Quantitative Information Flow. Exploiting this relation, we combine our new
self-composition technique with a Symbolic Execution-based reliability analysis tool
to quantify information leaks in Java bytecode.
6.1 Introduction
Recall that in section 2.1.1, we have introduced the theorem proving approach to non-
interference, in which non-interference is logically formulated by self-composition.
As far as we are aware, this has been the only approach for qualitative analysis
that returns neither false positives nor false negatives. We also quoted the claim of
Terauchi and Aiken [113] that self-composition was impractical and that it would
be unlikely to expect any future advance. The main limitations of self-composition,
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as pointed out by Terauchi and Aiken, come from the symmetry and redundancy of
the self-composed program, which lead to some partial-correctness conditions that
hold between P and P1. To find these conditions is crucial for the effectiveness of the
analysis, however, finding them is in general impractical. He we present a practical
implementation for self-composition.
6.1.1 Qualitative analysis
The idea of self-composition is to have a copy P1 of the program P to compare with
itself. The approach can be divided into two steps: the first step is to compose
the program with a copy of itself; the second one is to perform analysis on the self-
composed program. Our approach is to delay self-composing to the second step: first,
we perform analysis on the original program with Symbolic Execution; second, we
self-compose the result of the analysis to get the formula of self-composition.
We expand the idea of comparing the program P with it copy P1 into comparing
all pairs of executions ρ of P and ρ1 of P1. Since it is impossible to enumerate all
possible executions, we use Symbolic Execution to synthesize the symbolic paths that
represents a set of concrete executions, and perform comparison on these symbolic
paths, which we formulate as path-equivalence.
The delay of self-composing after performing the analysis is the main novelty of
our approach. In this way, we could avoid the symmetry and redundancy of the self-
composed program. Moreover, the symbolic paths synthesized by Symbolic Execution
are presented by first-order theories, just as the generated formula of self-composition.
The validity of this formula can be automatically and efficiently checked by powerful
SMT solvers.
6.1.2 Quantitative analysis
Traditional self-composition technique can only tell if a program leaks information.
On the contrary, we can refine our Symbolic Execution-based self-composition into a
more fine-grained analysis that can decide if a path of the program leaks information.
We then quantify the leaks for each symbolic path using a reliability analysis tool.
Our approach is implemented into an automated tool, called QILURA (which stands
for Quantify Information Leaks Using Reliability Analysis). Given a program, and
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inputs labeled as high and low, QILURA computes an upper bound on the maximum
number of bits that the program can leak to a public observer. Our implementation is
done in the context of Java bytecode programs and the SPF [100] symbolic execution
engine, extended for reliability analysis [59]. However, the work is general and can be
applied in the context of any programming language for which a symbolic execution
tool exists.
Program Symbolic 
PathFinder 
Labeling 
Procedure 
Z3 Omega 
Quantifying 
Procedure 
Latte 
Input 
labels 
k bits 
Figure 6.1: Architecture of QILURA
At a high level, the architecture of QILURA is depicted in Figure 6.1. The user labels
the inputs of the program with high and low. The program is then passed to SPF
to collect all possible symbolic paths. The Labeling Procedure, using a fine-grained
self-composition [22], classifies all the paths into three categories: clean, direct and
indirect. The procedure uses z3 [53] for satisfiability checking of self-composition
condition.
Finally, the Quantifying Procedure uses Barvinok model counting techniques [5] over
the symbolic constraints (simplified using Omega [7]) collected by SPF to count the
number of inputs that follow paths labeled with “direct” and provides an upper bound
of k bit on the leaks.
6.2 Preliminaries
This section reformulates Symbolic Execution and provides some background on the
new Symbolic Execution-based reliability analysis framework of Filieri et al. [59].
6.2.1 Symbolic Execution
In chapter 4, we described Symbolic Execution on a Symbolic Transition System
which modelled in detail the transition of a program with guards and actions. These
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details are not necessary in this chapter and are not captured in the transition system
in section 2.3, that we use to describe concrete execution. Therefore, we reformulate
Symbolic Execution in a more coarse-grained transition system that only takes in to
account the source and target states of a transition. A program P is modelled as
follows:
P = (S∗, I∗, F ∗, T ∗)
where S∗ is the set of symbolic states; each s∗ ∈ S∗ represents a set of concrete states
s ∈ S. I∗ ⊆ S∗ is the set of initial symbolic states; F ∗ ⊆ S∗ is the set of final symbolic
states; and T ∗ ⊆ S∗×S∗ is the transition function. A symbolic path (symbolic trace)
of the program P is represented by a sequence of symbolic states:
ρ∗ = s∗0s
∗
1..s
∗
k
such that s∗0 ∈ I∗, s∗k ∈ F ∗ and 〈s∗i , s∗i+1〉 ∈ T ∗ for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}. The symbolic
semantics of P is then defined as the set of all symbolic paths R∗, which is also called
as the symbolic execution tree. Likewise, each ρ∗ ∈ R∗ represents a set of traces
ρ ∈ R.
We denote by X|y the value of the variable X at the state y. After symbolically
executing the program P with initial input symbols H = α,L = β, for each s∗i ∈ F ∗,
i.e. each leaf of the symbolic execution tree, we have a symbolic formula for the value
of the output O in the symbolic environment:
O|s∗i = fi(α, β)
Another product of SE is the path condition pci ≡ ci(α, β) for s∗i to be reachable.
Each pci corresponds to a symbolic path ρ
∗
i . The following theorem was also proved
by King [74]:
Theorem 3
∀i, j ∈ [1, n] ∧ i 6= j.pci ∧ pcj = ⊥
We define the function path such that:
path(ρ∗i ) = pci
The output O can be considered as a result of the following function:
O =

f1(α, β) if c1(α, β)
f2(α, β) if c2(α, β)
. . . . . .
fn(α, β) if cn(α, β)
 (6.1)
Or the following always holds:
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Corollary 2
∀i ∈ [1, n].ci(α, β)→ O = fi(α, β)
fi and ci are in general combination of first-order theories, e.g. linear arithmetic,
bit vector and so on. SE tools make use of off-the-shelf SMT solvers to check the
satisfiability of ci, and eliminate unreachable paths (which may appear in the control
flow graph).
6.2.2 Reliability Analysis
Reliability analysis [37] aims to compute the probability that a program successfully
accomplishes its task without errors. Most previous work perform reliability analysis
at early stages of design, on a architectural abstraction of the program, and thus they
are not applicable to source code.
In [59], Filieri et al. introduced the first approach that can compute the reliability
of program from Java bytecode. Their approach is to use SE to enumerate each of
the symbolic paths (and its path condition pci). The symbolic path is then labelled
as: (i)T if the program accomplishes the task; (ii) F if the program reaches an error
state; (iii) G if we cannot decide because the path is not fully explored (G stands for
grey).
From the path condition pci, Filieri et al. use the tool Latte [5] to compute efficiently
the number of inputs #(pci) that satisfies the path condition pc. The reliability of
the program, i.e. the probability that the program accomplishes its task, is then
computed as:
R = Σ#(pc
T )
Σ#(pcT ) + Σ#(pcF ) + Σ#(pcG)
For QILURA we do not compute probabilities but use directly the counts over the
computed symbolic constraints.
6.3 Self-composition by Symbolic Execution
To avoid the limitation of the theorem proving approach, we need to reformulate the
self-composition formula into a simpler logic which does not contain the program P.
This is made possible by using the trace semantics of programs.
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6.3.1 Self-composition as path-equivalence
Given a program P that takes secret input H, public input L and producing public
output O; P1 is the same program as P, with all variables renamed: H as H1, L as L1
and O as O1. The trace semantics of P and P1 are R and R1 respectively.
Definition 22 (trace-equivalence) The program P satisfies non-interference if:
∀ρ ∈ R, ρ1 ∈ R1.L|init(ρ) = L1|init(ρ1) → O|fin(ρ) = O1|fin(ρ1) (6.2)
It is stated similarly to the Hoare triple in (2.1): for all possible pairs of traces ρ of P,
and ρ1 of P1: if L = L1 at the initial states, then O = O1 at the final states. At this
point, we have a formulation of self-composition that does not involve the programs
P and P1.
However, even with simple programs, it is impossible to compute all the traces. Our
solution is to use trace-equivalence with SE. Recall that each symbolic path represents
a set of traces, and it is possible to build a complete symbolic execution tree (here
we only consider bounded programs). Following Corollary 2, trace-equivalence in the
context of SE is redefined as follows:
Definition 23 (path-equivalence) The program P satisfies non-interference if and
only if for all ρ∗ ∈ R∗ and for all ρ∗1 ∈ R∗1, the following equation holds:
(L|init(ρ∗) = L1|init(ρ∗1)) ∧ path(ρ∗) ∧ path(ρ∗1)→ (O|fin(ρ∗) = O1|fin(ρ∗1)) (6.3)
In this way, we have an SMT formula, i.e. a combination of first-order theories.
This is the key novelty of our approach, since the formulation of self-composition in
first-order theories enables us to solve it efficiently using off-the-shelf SMT solvers.
6.3.2 Path-equivalence generation
Suppose P is symbolically executed with H = α,L = β. To simplify the formula, we
choose the input symbols for P1 as H1 = α1, L1 = β so that L|init(ρ∗) = L1|init(ρ∗1) is
automatically satisfied. That means:
(H|init(ρ∗) = α) ∧ (L|init(ρ∗) = β) ∧ (H1|init(ρ∗1) = α1) ∧ (L1|init(ρ∗1) = β)
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Given the result of SE is a function of the output O as in (6.1), the path-equivalence
in (6.3) can be rewritten as:
PE ≡ DF ∧ IF
where:
DF ≡
n∧
i=1
ci(α, β) ∧ ci(α1, β)→ (fi(α, β) = fi(α1, β))
IF ≡
n−1∧
i=1
n∧
j=i+1
ci(α, β) ∧ cj(α1, β)→ (fi(α, β) = fj(α1, β))
DF checks the path-equivalence when both P and P1 follow the same symbolic path,
and thus it guarantees the absence of direct flows. On the other hand, IF checks the
path-equivalence when P and P1 follow different symbolic paths, and it guarantees the
absence of implicit flows.
6.3.3 Examples
We illustrate the approach with some toy examples. Here we assume the same setting
as above: a program P with confidential input H, public input L, and output O. SE
executes P with input symbols H = α and L = β.
Implicit flow
Consider the password checking program: By SE, we have:
if (H == L)
O = true;
else
O = false;
O =
{
true if α = β
false if α 6= β
}
DF and DF are generated as follows:
DF ≡ (α = β ∧ α1 = β → true = true) ∧ (α 6= β ∧ α1 6= β → false = false)
IF ≡ α = β ∧ α1 6= β → true = false
It is trivial to prove that DF is valid and IF is invalid, and thus the program violates
non-interference and leaks information via implicit flows.
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No flow
Consider the modified version of the password checking procedure in Listing 2.1.1.
if (H == L)
O = false;
else
O = false;
By SE, we have:
O =
{
false if α = β
false if α 6= β
}
DF and IF are generated as follows:
DF ≡ (α = β ∧ α1 = β → false = false) ∧ (α 6= β ∧ α1 6= β → false = false)
IF ≡ α = β ∧ α1 6= β → false = false
It is trivial to prove that both DF and IF are valid, and thus the program satisfies
non-interference. Note that this is the case that type systems, taint analysis would
decide as violating non-interference.
No confidential data involved.
Consider the password checking program, with a small modification to exclude the
confidential data in its computation, i.e. to make it secure.
if (L == 3)
O = true;
else
O = false;
Similarly we have:
O =
{
true if β = 3
false if ¬(β = 3)
}
DF and IF are derived as:
DF ≡ (β = 3 ∧ β = 3→ true = true) ∧ (¬(β = 3) ∧ ¬(β = 3)→ false = false)
IF ≡ β = 3 ∧ ¬(β = 3)→ true = false
Both DF and IF are valid, which confirms the intuition that the program is secure.
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Both implicit and explicit flows
Consider again the data sanitization program:
if (H < 16)
O = H + L;
else
O = L;
The summaries and path conditions returned by SE are as follows:
O =
{
α + β if α < 16
β if ¬(α < 16)
}
DF and DF are generated similarly:
DF ≡ (α < 16 ∧ α1 < 16→ α + β = α1 + β) ∧ (¬(α < 16) ∧ ¬(α1 < 16)→ β = β)
IF ≡ α < 16 ∧ ¬(α1 < 16)→ α + β = β
It is easy to find counterexamples to make DF and IF invalid, for example: (α =
1;α1 = 2) for DF and (α = 1;α1 = 17) for IF. So the program leaks via both implicit
and explicit flows.
6.3.4 Optimization
After SE collects the symbolic paths and path conditions as in (6.1), there are three
possible cases for a ρ∗ ∈ R∗:
• O|fin(ρ∗) and path(ρ∗) does not contain α: ρs can be classified as “secure”, and is
excluded in computing DF and IF. With this optimization, programs like the
one in Figure 2.1.1 can be classified as secure without computing anything.
• O|fin(ρ∗) does not contain α; path(ρ∗) contains α: in this case, computing DF for
this path will result a formula C(β)→ true which is valid for any C. Therefore,
ρ∗ is excluded in computing DF.
• O|fin(ρ∗) contains α: we can conclude that the program is insecure, leaking
information via direct flow. This is very similar to taint analysis, however SE
is more precise, since it can detect cases such as H × 0 or H −H and so on.
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These three optimizations are sufficient to eliminate the computation of DF, and
simplify the formula to be validated.
In a previous paper [113], Terauchi and Aiken presented an interesting program that
computes Fibonacci numbers, and containing confidential data. Applying the self-
composition technique for this program turned out to be very tricky because of the
symmetry and redundancy of the self-composed program, and the state-of-the-art
safety analysis tool BLAST failed to terminate. With our Symbolic Execution-based
approach and these optimizations, the case study becomes trivial, and can be checked
quickly without computation of DF and IF.
6.4 Quantifying Information Leaks by combining
Self-composition and Reliability Analysis
At a high level, QILURA performs a two-step analysis. First, SE is run to collect
all symbolic paths of the program (up to a user-specified depth), then each path
is assigned a label: (i) clean: if it leaks no information, (ii) direct: if it leaks
information via direct flow, and (iii) indirect: if it leaks information via indirect
flow. Secondly, a model counter for symbolic paths from [59] is used to count the
number of possible inputs that go to “direct” paths, and compute an upper bound on
the leakage. QILURA is available at: https://github.com/qif/jpf-qilura.
6.4.1 Fine-grained self-composition
Checking the satisfiability of the path-equivalence condition PE ≡ DF∧IF in section
6.3.2 can only decide whether a program leaks information. However, we can refine
it to a path-level analysis of leakage.
We assume the same settings as in section 6.3.2: we symbolically execute the program
P with the input symbols: H = α, L = β, and the program P1 with the input symbols
H1 = α1, L1 = β. Based on the path-equivalence condition for direct flow and indirect
flow, we define the self-composition condition for each symbolic path as follows.
Definition 24 Given a path ρ∗i such that path(ρ
∗
i ) = ci(α, β) and O|fin(ρ∗i ) = fi(α, β),
ρ∗i does not leak information via direct flow if and only if the following condition holds:
ci(α, β) ∧ ci(α1, β)→ (fi(α, β) = fi(α1, β))
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Applying the material implication rule on the condition above results in:
¬(ci(α, β) ∧ ci(α1, β)) ∨ (fi(α, β) = fi(α1, β))
In case ρ∗i leaks information via direct flow, the condition above is violated, which
means its negation is satisfiable:
¬(¬(ci(α, β) ∧ ci(α1, β)) ∨ (fi(α, β) = fi(α1, β)))
This formula can be simplified using De Morgan’s law as:
ci(α, β) ∧ ci(α1, β) ∧ ¬(fi(α, β) = fi(α1, β)) (6.4)
Definition 25 Given two symbolic paths ρ∗i and ρ
∗
j such that path(ρ
∗
i ) = ci(α, β),
O|fin(ρ∗i ) = fi(α, β), path(ρ∗j) = cj(α, β) and O|fin(ρ∗j ) = fj(α, β), ρ∗i and ρ∗j do not
leak information via indirect flow if and only if the following condition holds:
ci(α, β) ∧ cj(α1, β)→ (fi(α, β) = fj(α1, β))
Similar to the derivation above, in case ρ∗i and ρ
∗
j leaks information via indirect flow,
the following formula is satisfiable.
ci(α, β) ∧ cj(α1, β) ∧ ¬(fi(α, β) = fj(α1, β)) (6.5)
Based on the conditions in (6.4) and (6.5), we implement a procedure to label all
symbolic paths as in Figure 6.2. The function isSAT is implemented by calling the
SMT solver z3 [53].
The algorithm of this procedure is straightforward. At the beginning, all paths are
labeled as being clean. The procedure then searches for direct flow by checking
the condition (6.4) for all paths. It then searches for indirect flow by checking the
condition (6.5) on all possible pairs of symbolic paths.
6.4.2 Model Counting for Symbolic Paths
For a symbolic path ρ, let #in(ρ) and #out(ρ) denote the number of concrete inputs
and outputs of ρ respectively. Obviously #in(ρi) is #(pci) computed in [59]. After
being labeled, all paths are classified into three categories: clean, direct and indirect.
So the channel capacity is bounded by:
CC(P ) ≤ log2(S#out(ρc) + S#out(ρi) + S#out(ρd))
where ρc is the clean path, ρi is the indirect path, and ρd is the indirect path.
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for all ρi do {
label[i] ← clean
ϕ← ci(α, β) ∧ ci(α1, β) ∧ ¬(fi(α, β) = fi(α1, β))
if (isSAT(ϕ)) label[i] ← direct
end for}
for i = 1 to n− 1 do
for j = i+ 1 to n do {
ϕ← ci(α, β) ∧ cj(α1, β) ∧ ¬(fi(α, β) = fj(α1, β))
if (isSAT(ϕ)) {
if (label[i] = clean) label[i] ← indirect
if (label[j] = clean) label[j] ← indirect
}
end for}
end for
Figure 6.2: Fine-grained self-composition
• Since clean paths are not interfered by the confidential input we can replace
S#out(ρc) with 1.
• An indirect path only reveals that the program follows that path, its output
is not interfered, and each path has one output. Thus, S#out(ρi) is just the
number of indirect paths.
• We hence only need to compute S#out(ρd).
A deterministic program can be viewed as a function that maps each input to ex-
actly one output (denotational semantics). Therefore, the number of inputs is always
greater than or equal to the number of possible outputs. This means #in(ρ) ≥
#out(ρ), and S#in(ρd) ≥ S#out(ρd).
By using the model counting engine for symbolic paths in [59], we can compute
S#in(ρd), and hence compute an upper bound of channel capacity CC(P ).
6.5 Evaluation
Automated QIF analysis is notoriously hard. To the best of our knowledge, the only
tool for QIF analysis of Java bytecode is our own work jpf-qif [98] which uses SE for
QIF analysis, but no model counting. Instead jpf-qif adds the conditions for testing
each bit of the output at the end of the program, hence exploring all these conditions
using SPF. We compare jpf-qif with QILURA below.
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We also compare with BitPattern [85], which computes an upper bound on channel
capacity by exploring the relations between every pair of bits of the output. In
more recent work [86], BitPattern was improved using new heuristics. We compare
QILURA with (the improved) BitPattern on several case studies taken from [85, 86].
if (H > 999){
O = -1;
}
O = H;
O = O - H;
Figure 6.3: No flow
Moreover, we consider a special case when the program does not leak any information
to assess the effectiveness and precision of our technique in such a corner case. The
program does not leak information because the output O is always 0 regardless of the
value of the secret H. However, the assignment O = H and the condition H > 999
make the program be rejected by other qualitative information-flow techniques, e.g.
the ones based on type systems or taint analysis.
6.5.1 Results and discussions
Figure 6.4 summaries our experiment, we take the time from the faster version of
BitPattern in [86]. Note that in both [85] and [86], the authors manually transform
the programs into bit vector predicates, so there will be extra time if they automate
this process.
Case Study
jpf-qif QILURA BitPattern
Capacity Time Bound Time Bound Time
No Flow 0 2.304 0 0.790 - -
Sanity check, base =0x00001000 4 45.324 4.09 1.066 4 0.036
Sanity check, base =0x7ffffffa 4 35.346 4.09 1.049 4.59 0.203
Implicit Flow 2.81 0.897 3 0.796 3 0.011
Electronic Purse 2 1.169 2.32 0.854 2 0.157
Ten random outputs 3.32 1.050 3.32 0.814 18.645 0.224
Figure 6.4: Capacity and bounds are in bits, times are in seconds. “-” means “not
reported”.
Comparing with jpf-qif, QILURA has both advantage and disadvantage. As shown
in Figure 6.4, thanks to the model counting tool Latte, QILURA is much faster than
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jpf-qif while the upper bounds it computed only deviate to a small extent from the
exact channel capacities.
This increase in performance comes with a price, Latte can only count models of
a system of linear integer inequalities Ax¯ > b¯. For this reason, QILURA cannot
analyse the case studies of CRC and Tax Record in chapter 4, which have complicated
constraints. The limitation due to using Latte is shared with previous work [16, 75]
which were also demonstrated with toy examples.
The BitPattern technique can also compute rather tight upper bounds in most of the
cases. However, by analysing the relations of pairs of bits, the technique is vulnerable
when possible values of the output are not in a specific range, as shown in the last
case study.
6.6 Discussion of related work
Self-composition was first introduced by Darvas et al. [50] who expressed it in a
dynamic logic and proved information flow properties for Java CARD programs.
Their approach is not automated, requiring users to provide loop invariants, induction
hypotheses and so on. Barthe et al. [22] then coined the term “self-composition” and
investigated its theoretical aspects, extending the problem to non-deterministic and
termination-sensitive cases.
Terauchi and Aiken [113] found that self-composition was problematic, since the self-
composed programs contains symmetry and redundancy. They proposed a type-
directed transformation for a simple imperative language to deal with the problem.
Milushev et al. [87] implemented this type-directed transformation and used Dynamic
Symbolic Execution (also known as concolic testing) as a program analysis tool for
non-interference.
To our knowledge, our technique is unique in that it only performs analysis on the
original program, rather than the self-composed program, the idea of self-composition
is shown in the way we rename the symbolic formula, not in the analysis stage.
Backes et al. [16] describe how to use the model checker ARMC and Latte for QIF
analysis. Their technique is very precise but also extremely expensive: it involves
input counting to compute the pre-image of the observables; in contrast our input
counting is used for counting the observable. The work of Backes et al. is extended in
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[75], which uses the interactive theorem prover KeY instead of ARMC, and requiring
significant user effort. Moreover, this work is based on “classical ” self-composition,
and as Terauchi and Aiken [113] have pointed out, it is unlikely practical. Of course,
both [16] and [75] were demonstrated with toy examples.
The only technique that can precisely determine if a program leaks information is self-
composition [22]. QILURA also uses self-composition with the key difference that it
is able to determine if a single symbolic path leaks information.
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Chapter 7
A solver for Model Counting
Modulo Theories
Recall that in Section 3.3, we have casted the problem of QIF analysis into the
#SMT problem and proposed two #SMT-based approaches to QIF, which can be
summarized by the figure below.
P ϕP
QIF #SMT
Formal methods DPLL(T )
So far we have investigated the approach on the left-hand side: we directly analyse
the program P, and use formal methods, specifically Bounded Model Checking and
Symbolic Execution, in a way that mimics a #SMT solver for QIF analysis.
This chapter investigates our second approach on the right-hand side: it demonstrates
how to build from the program P a formula ϕP with the two properties described in
section 3.3, and how to build a #SMT solver to count the models of ϕP .
Moreover, we study a variant of the #SMT problem: the All-Solution Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (All-SMT) problem. All-SMT is only different from #SMT in that
instead of counting the number of model, it asks for the enumeration of all models.
We show that our algorithms for #SMT can also be used for All-SMT, and we propose
the use of an All-SMT solver in new application domains: Bounded Model Checking,
automated test generation and reliability analysis.
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7.1 Quantifying Information Leaks using a #SMT
solver
We assume the setting in our attacker model in Figure 2.1: a program P that takes
secret input H, public input L and producing public output O. Our analysis consists
of two steps as the following.
• The first step is to build a first-order formula from the program P a formula
ϕP with the following properties: (i) ϕP contains a set of Boolean variables
VI := {p1, p2, .., pM}; (ii) pi = > if and only if bi is 1, and pi = ⊥ if and only if
bi = 0.
• The second step is to use a #SMT solver to count the number of models of ϕP
with respect to the set VI .
We will show how to build a #SMT solver later in the next section. At the moment,
we assume that there is such a solver for our QIF analysis.
7.1.1 Illustrative Example
To demonstrate the approach, let us consider again the previously used illustrative
example in Figure 3.1, which can be encoded into a first-order formula as in Figure 7.1.
L = 8;
if (H < 16)
O = H + L;
else
O = L;
(L1 = 8) ∧
(G0 = H0 < 16) ∧
(O1 = H0 + L1) ∧
(O2 = L1) ∧
(O3 = g?O1 : O3)
Figure 7.1: A simple program encoded into a first-order formula
The program is transformed into Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [49]: variables
are renamed when they are reassigned. At the beginning, assuming that the variables
H, L and O take the value H0, L0 and O0 respectively after being declared. Then, L1
is the value of the variable L after being reassigned (as 8), and similarly for the rest
of the program.
We then need to build the set of boolean variable VI := {p1, p2, .., p32}. In chapter 3,
we directly analysed the program, and thus hence the set VI by instrumenting the
source code of the program P with the block of code in Figure 3.4. This block of
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code used bitwise operators to extract each bit of the output O. Here, we analyse the
formula (encoded from the program), and hence build the set VI by instrumenting the
formula. Moreover, the formula needs to be in a first-order theory T that supports
bitwise operators. Fortunately, the model checker CBMC can automatedly transform
a C program into a formula in the theory of bit vector QF_AUFBV [21] which satisfies
this requirement.
The formula in Figure 7.1 can be easily expressed in QF_AUFBV with O3 declared
as a 32-bit vector. We instrument the formula by adding a set of Boolean variables
VI = {p1, p1, . . . p32}, each one tests the value of a bit of O3. For example:
(assert (= (= #b1 ((_ extract 0 0) O3)) p1))
This statement in SMT-LIB v2 format [21] extracts the first bit of O3 (all bits from
position 0 to position 0), then comparing if this bit is equal to 1 (#b1). The Boolean
variable p1 is asserted to be the truth value of this comparison. Similar settings are
applied for the rest of Boolean variables p2, p3, . . . , p32.
At this point we have built a formula ϕP that characterizes the behaviour of the
program P, and contains a set VI of Boolean variables, each one represents a bit of
the output O of the program P. By using a #SMT solver to count the number of
models of ϕP with respect to the set VI , which is also the number of possible values
of the output O, we can conclude the maximum leakage of the program P as per
definition 11.
7.1.2 Program transformation with CBMC
In our two-step analysis, the second step is automated with a #SMT solver, we only
need to automate the first step: building a formula ϕP from the program P.
C(“if(c) I1 else I2” , g) := C(I1, g ∧ ρ(c)) ∧ C(I2, g ∧ ¬ρ(c))
P(“if(c) I1 else I2”, g) := P(I1, g ∧ ρ(c)) ∧ P(I2, g ∧ ¬ρ(c))
C(“I1; I2” , g) := C(I1, g) ∧ C(I2, g)
P(“I1; I2”, g) := P(I1, g) ∧ P(I2, g)
P(“assert(a)”, g) := g → ρ(a)
C(“v = e”, g) := (vα = (g?ρ(e) : vα−1))
Figure 7.2: The two functions C(P, g) and P(P, g) for program transformation. ρ(c) is
expression c after being renamed as per SSA form; vα−1 and vα are value of v before
and after the assignment respectively.
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The model checker CBMC transforms a program P and a guard g into a logical
formula using two functions: C(P, g) transforms the program constraints, and P(P, g)
transforms the program specification, namely assertions. At the beginning, the guard
g is initialised to >. Both functions are defined by induction on the syntax of program
as in Figure 7.2 (interested readers are pointed to [45] for full details).
In its default settings, CBMC transforms the program and its specification into a
propositional formula. However, it also has the option −−smt2 (still experimental)
to transform the program and specification into a QF_AUFBV formula in SMT-LIB
v2 format. Hence, we use leverage this option to build the formula ϕP .
Recall (section 2.4.1) that the formula generated by CBMC is in the form C ∧ ¬P ,
where C is the program constraints, and P is the program specification, i.e. assertions.
Since we only assess the security of a program when it is free from errors, we only
need the program constraints C. However, without a specification, the aggressive
program slicing in CBMC can decide immediately that the program does not violate
any specification, and do not generate any formula. This is actually a strong feature
of CBMC, however it prevents us from getting a formula C.
A simple solution for the problem above is to add a fake error, “assert(0);”, at the
end of the program. Hence, the generated formula is C ∧ ¬⊥, or simply C.
7.1.3 Formula instrumentation
As we have demonstrated with the example, we need to instrument the formula
generated by CBMC with a set of Boolean variables VI .
In the SSA form, a variable is renamed when it is reassigned. For example, the
output O is named O0 when initialised. When it is assigned, it is renamed to O1, and
so on. The index is incremented, and O keeps the final value after final assignment.
Therefore, we build a simple parser to locate the variable Ok renamed from the output
O, which has the maximal index k.
The declaration of the set of Boolean variables VI , and theirs binding with the bits of
Ok can be appended to the end of the formula. The whole formula instrumentation
procedure is implemented in a simple Java program.
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7.2 All-Solution Satisfiability Modulo Theories
The SMT solver MathSAT, from version 4 [30], provides a functionality, called All-
SMT, that given a formula ϕ and a set VI of important Boolean variables, MathSAT
in All-SMT mode computes all models of ϕ with respect to the set VI .
In this thesis, we extend the All-SMT of MathSAT with a set VR of relevant, possibly
non-Boolean, variables. The extended All-SMT(ϕ, VI , VR) problem is to compute all
models of ϕ with respect to the set VI and the models includes value assignment for
variables in VR. We show how this All-SMT problem can be used to analyse the
availability, reliability and security of programs:
• Bounded Model Checking [26]: SMT-based Bounded Model Checking can only
return a single error traces, the user has to fix the error, then run the model
checker again for other error traces. This is because SMT solvers can only return
one model. Combining Bounded Model Checking with an All-SMT solver, we
can compute multiple counterexamples in one run of the model checker.
• Automated Test Generation: an All-SMT solver can be combined with either
a Symbolic Executor or a Bounded Model Checker for test input generation.
Although traditional Symbolic Execution with an SMT solver is capable of
generating test inputs, it needs to make hundreds or thousands of calls to the
SMT solver. In our approach, the Symbolic Execution tool needs to make only
one call to the All-SMT solver for any programs.
• Reliability analysis : we can build a reliability analysis tool by combining an
All-SMT solver with a Symbolic Executor to enumerate all path conditions of
the program, then using the Barvinok model counting technique [5] to compute
the number of inputs that go into each symbolic path. In this way, we can
compute the reliability of the program, i.e. the probability that the program
successfully accomplishes its task without errors.
7.2.1 Multiple-counterexamples for BMC
Recall that (section 2.4.1), Bounded Model Checking (BMC) transforms the program
and its specification into a formula, then solving the resulting formula with a SAT or
SMT solver.
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Since a SAT or SMT solver can only return a single model, state-of-the-art SAT-
based or SMT-based Bounded Model Checker can only return a single error trace
per run. The user has to fix the error and run the model checker again to find more
error traces. On the other hand, All-SMT solver can return all models w.r.t. a set of
Boolean variable, it can be exploited to find multiple counterexamples for BMC.
x=x+y;
if(x!=1){
x=2;
if(z) x++;
assert(y > 1);
}
assert(x ≤ 3);
→
x1=x0+y0;
if(x1!=1){
x2=2;
if(z0) x3=x2+1;
assert(y0 > 1);
}
assert(x3 ≤ 3);
→
C := x1 = x0 + y0 ∧
x2 = ((x1 6= 1)?2 : x1) ∧
x3 = ((x1 6= 1 ∧ z0)?x2 + 1 : x2)
P := (x1 6= 1→ y0 > 1) ∧ (x3 ≤ 3)
Figure 7.3: Example, modified from [45]: the program is transformed into Static
Single Assignment form, and then encoded into a logical formula
To illustrate our approach, we reconsider an example from [45], which was used to
illustrate CBMC [44]. The example is shown in Figure 7.3, we have modified it,
adding the assertion (y > 1), so that the program P contains more than one error.
At the first step, the program is transformed into SSA form.
As shown in Figure 7.3, applying C(P, g) and P(P, g) in the SSA program results in
the set of guards (x1 6= 1) and (z0 6= 0). We denote Boolean variable g1 and g2 such
that g1 := BA(x1 6= 1) and g2 := BA(z0 6= 0).
A model of the formula C ∧ ¬P will correspond to a trace of the program that
violates the specification P . By asking an All-SMT solver to return all models of
ϕ = C ∧¬P with respect to the set of Boolean abstraction of variables in the guards,
i.e. VI = {g1, g2}, we can get a set of all models, each one corresponds to an error
trace.
Note that each error trace represents a set of concrete execution, to get the inputs
for just one representative concrete execution that triggers the error, we set them as
the relevant variables to be included in the models, which means VR = {x0, y0, z0}.
In this case hence VI represents the guards of the program and VR the inputs.
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7.2.2 Automated Test Generation
This section shows how an All-SMT solver can be used in two different approaches for
Automated Test Generation (ATG), namely Bounded Model Checking and Symbolic
Execution.
ATG using Bounded Model Checking
We use the same trick as in the previous section. The goal is to compute all models
of a formula, each one corresponds to a program traces in the program. Take an
example as in Figure 7.4. Different from the one in Figure 7.3, the program contains
no error, so it will go through CBMC without any solver being called. CBMC will
not generate a formula either.
void foo(int x, int y){
if(x > 5){
x++;
if (x < 3)
x--;
else
y = x + 1;
}
return;
}
(g1 = x1 > 5) ∧
(x2 = 1 + x1) ∧
(g2 = x2 < 3) ∧
(x3 = −1 + x2) ∧
(x4 = x2) ∧
(y2 = 1 + x4) ∧
(x5 = g2?x3 : x4) ∧
(y3 = g2?y1 : y2) ∧
(x6 = ¬g1?x1 : x5) ∧
(y4 = ¬g1?y1 : y3)
Figure 7.4: A simple program encoded into a formula
In order to generate test inputs that cover all program paths (to a given bound),
similar to the previous section, we append “assert (0);” as a fake error at the end
of the program. Since this error is reachable by all program paths, CBMC will include
all the paths into the formula.
The box in the right in Figure 7.4 shows the formula encoded by CBMC. We run
the All-SMT solver on the formula with VI = {g1, g2}, VR = {x1, y1}. The All-SMT
solver will return a set of solutions, each one contains value assignments for x1 and
y1, which can be used as test input for the function foo.
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ATG using Symbolic Execution
Recall that Symbolic Execution (SE) executes programs on unspecified inputs, by
using symbolic inputs instead of concrete data. For each executed program path,
a path condition pc is built which represents the condition on the inputs for the
execution to follow that path, according to the branching conditions in the code.
In classical SE, the satisfiability of the path condition is checked at every branching
point, using off-the-shelf solvers. In this way only feasible program paths are explored.
Test generation is performed by solving the path conditions.
Here we propose another approach for SE using All-SMT solver. We use SE with
the constraint solver turning off, to compute the set of all possible program paths:
pc1, pc2, . . . pcM . Since there is no constraint solving, a pci can be infeasible. Hence,
the program under test can be viewed as corresponding to the following formula:
ϕ := pc1 ∨ pc2 · · · ∨ pcM
To illustrate, let us consider again the program in Figure 7.4. The program can be
viewed as corresponding to the formula:
ϕ := ((x > 5) ∧ (x+ 1 < 3)) ∨
((x > 5) ∧ ¬(x+ 1 < 3)) ∨
¬(x > 5)
(7.1)
Notice that the path (x > 5) ∧ (x + 1 < 3) is infeasible, but it is still included in
the formula, since we do not check the constraint at each branching point. Applying
Boolean abstraction on ϕ leads to:
BA := ((C1 = (x > 5)) ∧ (C2 = (x+ 1 < 3)))
We use an All-SMT solver on ϕ∧BA with VI = {C1, C2} and VR = {x, y}. The set of
models returned by the All-SMT solver is the set of feasible paths, and the evaluation
of relevant variables can be used as test inputs for the program.
Also for ATG VI represents the guards of the program and VR the inputs.
7.2.3 Reliability analysis
This section introduces an alternative implementation for the approach in [59] by
using our All-SMT-based SE instead of classical SE. The improvement is that we
only need to make only one call to the All-SMT solver to explore all feasible paths.
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void foo(int x, y){
if(x > 5){
x++;
if (x < 3)
x--;
else {
y = x + 1;
assert false;
}
}
return;
}
Let us consider again the previous example with only one difference: we add an error
for the path x ≥ 3. Similar to the previous section, we use SE with the constraint
solver turning off, to encode the program into a logical formula ϕ as in (7.1). More-
over, the two paths ((x > 5) ∧ (x + 1 < 3)) and ¬(x > 5) are labelled with T,
as in these two paths the program finishes normally. On the other hand, the path
((x > 5) ∧ ¬(x+ 1 < 3)) is labelled with F since an error is reachable in this path.
Similar to the previous section, using an All-SMT solver on ϕ∧BA with VI = {C1, C2}
and VR = {x, y} will eliminate the infeasible path ((x > 5) ∧ (x + 1 < 3)). We then
can use the Latte tool to count the models for each paths, and compute the reliability
of the program.
7.3 Algorithms for #SMT and All-SMT solver
Obviously, there is no off-the-shelf solver for our new problem #SMT. The closet to
a #SMT solver is the functionality All-SMT of MathSAT. However, MathSAT does
not support model generation for relevant variables in All-SMT mode. Moreover,
when using MathSAT for our analysis, MathSAT returns incorrect number of models
in several benchmarks (we will show later in section 7.4). For these reasons, we have
developed a lightweight approach to implement an All-SMT/#SMT front-end for
SMT solvers. We build our algorithms from a number of APIs provided by the SMT
solver, which we list below.
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API Description
Assert(ϕ) Assert formula ϕ into the solver.
Check() Check consistency of all assertions.
Model() Get model of the last Check.
Eval(t) Evaluate expression t in current model.
Push() Create a backtracking point.
Pop(n= 1) Backtracks n backtracking points.
A key feature of SMT solvers for our algorithms is that of being incremental and
backtrackable. The following example shows a sequence of API calls and their effects
to the solver.
Assert(ϕ1); Check(); ϕ1 ⇒ SAT
Push(); ϕ1
Assert(ϕ2); Check(); ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇒ SAT
Push(); ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
Assert(ϕ3); Check(); ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ⇒ UNSAT
Pop(2); ϕ1
Assert(ϕ4); Check(); ϕ1 ∧ ϕ4 ⇒ SAT
It is possible for an incremental SMT solver to add additional assertions to the orig-
inal formula. Moreover, when Check is being called several times, the solver can
remember its computation from one call to the other. Thus, when being called to
check ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 after checking ϕ1, it avoids restarting the computation from scratch by
restarting the computation from the previous status. Backtrackable means that the
solver is able to undo steps, using Push and Pop, and returns to a previous status
on the stack in an efficient manner.
Both z3 [53] and MathSAT [30] provide similar APIs to interact with the solver in
incremental mode. Beside the APIs, we develop a function filter(m, VI , VR) that
given a model of the formula ϕ, and a set of important Boolean variable VI , and
the set of relevant variables VR, the function will return a subset mir of m that only
contains literals from VI and VR. This function will be used in both algorithms.
7.3.1 Blocking clauses method
A straightforward approach for #SMT is to add clauses that prevent the solver from
finding the same solution again.
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function All-BC(ϕ, VI , VR) {
N ← 0; Ψ ← ;
Assert(ϕ);
while (Check() = SAT) {
N ← N + 1;
m ← Model(ϕ);
mir ← filter(m, VI , VR);
Ψ ← Ψ ∪ {mir};
block ← FALSE;
for all pi ∈ VI do {
block ← block ∨ (pi 6= Eval(pi));
end for}
Assert (block);
}
return N, Ψ ;
}
Figure 7.5: Blocking clauses #SMT
The pseudo-code for the blocking clauses method is shown in Figure 7.5. Every time
the solver discovers a solution m of ϕ such that m = l0 ∧ l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln ∧ . . . , in which
only l0, l1 . . . ln are literals of p0, p1 . . . pn in VI . The negation of l1∧ l2∧ · · ·∧ ln would
be, by De Morgan’s law, as follows:
block = ¬l0 ∨ ¬l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ln
A literal li in the model can be viewed as a mapping pi to {TRUE, FALSE}, thus the
negation ¬li is pi 6= Eval(pi). By adding this clause to the formula, byAssert(block),
a solution with l0 ∧ l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln will not be discovered again. This procedure repeats
until no other solution is found. At that point, we have enumerated all the solution
of ϕ with respect to VI . All solutions are stored in Ψ , and N = |Ψ | is the result for
the corresponding #SMT problem.
The blocking clauses method is straightforward and it is simple to implement. How-
ever, adding a large number of blocking clauses will consume a large amount of mem-
ory. Moreover, increasing number of clauses also means that the Boolean Constraint
Propagation procedure is slowed down. Despite these inefficiencies, the blocking
clauses method can be used to verify the results of other techniques.
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7.3.2 Depth-first search
To address the inefficiencies of adding a large number of clauses, we introduce an alter-
native method which avoids re-discovering solutions using depth-first search (DFS).
We divide the set of variables of ϕ into two sets: VI is the set of important Boolean
variables, and VU is the set of unimportant, possibly non-Boolean, variables (VR ⊆
VU). Hence, the formula ϕ can be viewed as a function:
VI × VU → {TRUE, FALSE}
Our #SMT procedure is the integration of two components: the first component is
a simple SAT solver to enumerate all possible partial truth assignments µI of VI ; the
second component is the SMT solver to check the consistency of ϕ ∧ µI .
function All-DFS(ϕ, VI , VR) {
N ← 0; Ψ ← ;
Assert(ϕ);
if (Check() 6= SAT) return N, Ψ ;
depth ← 0; finished ← FALSE;
while (finished = FALSE) {
l← choose_literal(VI);
Push();
Assert(l); depth ← depth + 1;
if (Check() = SAT) {
if (depth = |VI |) {
N ← N + 1;
m ← Model(ϕ);
mir ← filter(m, VI , VR);
Ψ ← Ψ ∪ {mir};
backtrack();
} }
else backtrack();
}
return N, Ψ ;
}
Figure 7.6: Depth-first search #SMT
The pseudo-code for DFS-based #SMT is depicted in Figure 7.6. The method
choose_literal chooses the next states to explore from VI in a DFS manner, and the
variable depth keeps the number of important variables that has been chosen. That
means, choose_literal will select a literal VI [depth] or ¬VI [depth]. This literal is
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“pushed ” to the formula as a unit clauses. Recall that the plain DPLL algorithm [51]
is a depth-first search combining with the BCP procedure. Here we do not perform
BCP, however by adding all literals of µI as unit clauses to ϕ, we force the SMT
solver to perform BCP on those literals.
When all important variables has been assigned a truth value, i.e. depth = |VI |,
and the formula in the solver is consistent, then the search has found a model. It
then backtracks to find another one. The method backtrack implements a simple
chronological backtracking, it “pops” the unit clauses and sets the variable finished
to TRUE when all states are explored. It is also called when the formula in the solver
is inconsistent.
Compare to the blocking clauses method, the DFS-based method is much more effi-
cient in term of memory usage. The blocking clauses method needs to add N blocking
clauses to find all models while the DFS adds maximum |VI | of unit clauses. The
memory efficiency leads to timing efficiency when there are a large number of models.
7.3.3 Implementation
We have implemented both of the methods discussed above in a prototype tool, called
aZ3. The tool is built in Java, using the APIs provided by the SMT solver z3 [53].
aZ3 supports standard SMT-LIB v2 with two additional commands: the first one is
check-allsat, similar to MathSAT, to specify the list of important variables, and
the second one is allsat-relevant to specify the list of relevant variables.
We have also implemented a QIF analyzer, called sqifc++, which uses CBMC to
encode a program into a formula, then invoking aZ3 to compute channel capacity.
7.4 Evaluation
We make two experiments: the first one is to compare our #SMT solver aZ3 against
MathSAT modified for #SMT; the second one is to compare the QIF approach using
a #SMT solver with the one in chapter 3, which uses formal methods.
The benchmarks, the aZ3 solver, and the wrapper of MathSAT for #SMT can be
found at: http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~qsp30/test/allsmt.tar.gz.
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7.4.1 Evaluation of #SMT solvers
Benchmark
Expected MathSAT 5 aZ3
N N Time BC time DFS time
Q
F
_
L
I
A
Example in Figure 7.3 2 2 0.007 0.021 0.013
Example in Figure 7.4 3 3 0.005 0.008 0.007
Flap controller [59] 5 5 0.031 0.020 0.012
Red-black tree [11] 31 31 0.016 0.054 0.073
Bubble sort [2] 541 541 0.136 1.850 2.069
Array false [2] 1370 1370 0.037 3.008 2.650
Sum array false [2] 1024 1024 0.026 0.899 0.792
Linear search false [2] 1024 1024 0.028 0.899 0.604
Q
F
_
A
U
F
B
V
Data sanitization [85] 16 16 0.008 0.035 0.086
Implicit flow [85] 7 7 0.012 0.029 0.049
Population count [85] 33 71 0.012 0.074 0.398
Mix and duplicate [85] 65536 162087 4.648 - 136.947
Masked copy [85] 65536 65536 1.319 - 18.630
Sum query [85] 28 64 0.010 0.055 0.133
Ten random outputs [85] 10 10 0.014 0.038 0.093
CRC (8) [95] 8 12 0.018 0.041 0.099
CRC (32) [95] 32 36 0.019 0.075 0.325
Figure 7.7: N is the number of models. BC time and DFS time are the time of aZ3
using the blocking clauses method and depth-first search-based method respectively.
Times are in seconds. “-” means “timed out in 1 hour”. Notice that for both aZ3
implementations the number of models is Expected N.
In order to evaluate aZ3 and MathSAT, we create two set of benchmarks. The
first group of benchmarks are formulas in QF_LIA (integer linear arithmetic) [21].
These benchmarks are used to evaluate All-SMT solvers in the context of test input
generation. The formulas are generated using Symbolic PathFinder [100] (SPF). SPF
has a parameter, symbolic.dp, to set the constraint solver for it. If this parameter
set to no_solver, the tool will run without constraint solving.
The architecture of SPF enables us to attach a “listener” to it. When SPF executes
a program, the listener collects the path conditions, and outputs them to a QF_LIA
formula. The models of the integer variables can be used as test inputs for the original
programs.
The second group of benchmarks that we considered are formulas in QF_AUFBV [21]
(bit vector with array). The source of these benchmarks are programs in the QIF
literature, mostly re-collected in [85]. We use CBMC with the option −−smt2 to
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transform the programs into QF_AUFBV formulas, and instrument the resulting
formulas to make them #SMT problems. There are no relevant variables in these
benchmarks.
Discussion of evaluation
Figure 7.7 summaries our experiments with the two solvers aZ3 and MathSAT 5.2.11
on the benchmarks. In order to compare with MathSAT, we commented out the
relevant variables in the QF_LIA benchmarks. As shown in the figure MathSAT is
faster than aZ3. This is not surprised, since we build the tool from the front-end,
while the All-SMT functionality of MathSAT is built from the back-end, making use
of the internal data structure.
However, MathSAT returns incorrect models in several benchmarks. Especially, in
the benchmark “Mix and duplicate” MathSAT is significantly faster than aZ3, but it
is also extremely imprecise at the same time. Note that benchmarks in QF_AUFBV
are derived from the QIF literature, and their number of models were already reported
in other papers. For example “Mix and duplicate” was reported in [89] and [85] to
have 216 models.
The blocking clauses methods is comparable, or even faster than the DFS-based
method when the number of models is small. However, for the benchmarks with
216 models, adding 216 blocking clauses is obviously not efficient in both time and
memory. As a result, the method failed to provide the answer for such benchmarks.
On the other hand, the DFS-based method was still able to provide the answer in a
reasonable time.
7.4.2 Evaluation of QIF analysers
Figure 7.8 compares the performance of sqifc++ against the tool sqifc in chapter 3.
The results show that sqifc++ is much more efficient. The reason is that, sqifc makes
several calls to CBMC, and for each call CBMC has to transform the program into
a formula, then calling a SAT/SMT solver to check the formula. On the other hand,
sqifc++ transform the program only once, and its search is also more efficient.
However, sqifc++ relies on CBMC for program transformation, and this functionality
of CBMC (−−smt2) is still experimental. We found that CBMC generates incorrect
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Benchmark Leaks
sqifc sqifc++ time
time CBMC time aZ3 time Total
Data sanitization [85] 4 11.898 0.165 0.086 0.251
Implicit flow [85] 2.81 5.033 0.169 0.049 0.218
Population count [85] 5.04 17.278 0.162 0.398 0.560
Mix and duplicate [85] 16 - 0.154 136.947 137.101
Masked copy [85] 16 - 0.175 18.630 18.805
Sum query [85] 4.81 64.557 0.162 0.133 0.295
Ten random outputs [85] 3.32 64.202 0.160 0.093 0.253
CRC (8) [95] 3 2.551 0.184 0.099 0.283
CRC (32) [95] 5 7.755 0.193 0.325 0.518
Figure 7.8: Comparing the new approach with the sqifc tool in chapter 3. Leaks are
in bits. aZ3 runs with the DFS-based algorithm. Times are in seconds, “-” means
timeout in one hour. Total time of sqifc++ is the sum of CBMC time and aZ3 time.
formulas for several case studies in chapter 3, therefore we could not use sqifc++ to
analyse, for example, the dining cryptos case study.
7.5 Discussion of related work
7.5.1 Quantitative Information Flow
We have just compared the two prototype tools sqifc++ and sqifc in the previous
section. Moreover, in chapter 3, we already compared our #SMT-based approach
with other work in QIF literature, so we do not repeat the discussion here.
7.5.2 Multiple-counterexamples for BMC
The most relevant work to ours is that of Bhargavan et al. [24] embodied in the
Verisim testing tool for network protocols. When an error trace is found to violate
the specification, which is an extended LTL formula φ, Verisim uses a technique,
called tuning, to replace φ with ϕ that ignores the violation. Tuning is not fully
automatic.
Another technique introduced by Ball et al. [18] is embodied in the SLAM tool-kit.
The algorithm uses a model checker as a sub-routine. When the model checker finds
an error trace, SLAM localizes the error cause, modifying the source code with a halt
statement at the error cause. The model checker is then invoked again, and the halt
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statements instruct the model checker to stop exploring paths at the previously found
error causes. This procedure is very expensive, it requires comparing the error trace
with all correct traces to localize the error, and requires to run the model checker
several times. Our work is much simpler, and faster but the error traces we compute
can come from the same causes.
7.5.3 Automated Test Generation
The closest to our work is FShell [67], which also uses CBMC for automated test
generation. FShell transforms the program under test into a CNF formula, and
solves it using an incremental SAT solver. Every time the SAT solver finds a solution
representing a symbolic path, FShell adds a blocking clauses to prevent that path
from being explored again. As our experiments have shown, the blocking clauses
method is suffered from rapid space growth.
Classical Symbolic Execution also uses SMT solvers to check the satisfiability of path
condition. The SMT solver is called whenever a conditional statement is executed,
hence it may be called hundreds or thousands of times. In our approach, the symbolic
executor makes only one call to the All-SMT solver.
7.5.4 Reliability analysis
Our approach to reliability analysis is based on the paper of Filieri et al. [59] that
uses classical Symbolic Execution and Barvinok model counting tool. We extend
the approach using our new All-SMT-based Symbolic Execution instead of classical
Symbolic Execution. The main difference is the same as in the case of test generation,
our approach only makes one call to the All-SMT solver in the whole analysis.
7.5.5 All Solutions SAT Modulo Theories
As we have discussed throughout the chapter, MathSAT is the only SMT solver
that supports All-SMT. Its algorithm is briefly described in [92], and it has been
used to compute predicate abstraction in [34] and [38]. Our experiment results show
that MathSAT is imprecise in several benchmarks. However, we also notice that
the imprecisions seem to be limited in QF_AUFBV benchmarks, while the authors
performed experiments with QF_LRA formulas in [34].
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Also in the context of predicate abstraction, Lahiri et al. [79] have proposed several
techniques, which use the SMT solver Barcelogic to generate the set of all satisfying
assignments over a set of predicates. However, we are not able to include Barcelogic
in our experiments, since the solver provided to us by the author does not support
All-SMT.
A principal difference between the work mentioned above and the one in this chapter
is that we implemented from the front-end of an SMT solver. For this reason, our
implementation is slower than MathSAT. On the good side, our approach is applicable
to implement even in closed-source SMT solvers that do not support All-SMT but
provide similar APIs.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Summary
This thesis introduces a new research problem, Model Counting Modulo Theories
or #SMT, and presenting a #SMT-based approach to quantification of information
leaks. Although our implementations are far from being optimised, they drastically
outperform the existing technique based on self-composition, e.g. reducing the time
of analysing some programs from Linux kernel from some hours to a few seconds. Our
approach is applicable to programs with difficult data structures including pointers,
and to Java bytecode.
On the theoretical side, this thesis makes the original contributions by discovering
the relations among different research areas: (i) it casts the QIF problem into the
#SMT problem; (ii) it shows the correspondence between Symbolic Execution and
the DPLL(T ) algorithm; (iii) it explores the relation between Symbolic Execution
and Bounded Model Checking; (iv) finally, it exploits the connection between QIF
analysis and Reliability analysis.
On the application side, this thesis is the first to use Symbolic Execution to quantify
information leaks. It is also the first to use classical Symbolic Execution for Bounded
Model Checking. Beside, it proposes the use of an All-SMT solver for multiple-
counterexamples in Bounded Model Checking, for automated test generation, and for
reliability analysis.
On the practical side, this thesis has developed several tools in both C/C++ and Java:
sqifc, jpf-qif and QILURA, for the quantification of information leaks in software. It
112
also demonstrated the use of these tools to analyse vulnerabilities from the National
Vulnerability Database of the US government, and anonymity protocols.
For the verification community, important contributions of this thesis include the
development of JCBMC, a Concurrent Bounded Model Checker for Java, and the
All-SMT solver aZ3.
8.2 Future Research
In the previous chapter, we have proposed the use of an All-SMT solver for multiple-
counterexamples in Bounded Model Checking, for automated test generation and for
reliability analysis. An immediate direction would be to implement these ideas into
automated tools, and to perform experiments on standard benchmarks. Some other
possible directions for investigation are the following.
Fault localization
Another interesting avenue of further research would be to the All-SMT solver with
CBMC to localize error causes using similar idea in [18]. Models of ϕ1 = C ∧ P
correspond to correct traces that satisfy the specification, and models of ϕ2 = C ∧¬P
correspond to error traces that violate the specification. Using an All-SMT solver,
we can compute the sets of all models of ϕ1 and ϕ2 with respect to the set of guards.
Comparing the two sets of models, we can localize the transitions that only appear
in error traces.
Concurrent Bounded Model Checking
A first improvement on this direction would be to upgrade its concurrency from
single CPU multi-threading to true parallelism and to perform obvious optimisations.
Another improvement would be to replace Symbolic PathFinder with a lighter weight
tool, or a parallel version, to reduce the cost of generating path conditions. It will
also be interesting to implement the methodology for other languages (C, Python)
and investigate how to use Symbolic Execution for IC3 style verification.
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Statistical analysis for QIF
The QILURA tool is still just a prototype. A possible improvement for it would be
to use approximate exploration techniques to replace the exact, complete exploration
presented in this thesis. In this way, for the tool can be used with increased scalability,
but with formal statistical guarantees on the results.
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